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THE  
BRITISH ARMY  
IN 1873.



JOHN HOLMS, M.P.



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




**THE BRITISH ARMY**


**IN 1875.**












# ARMY CORPS

11839 Peace

22659 War




*NOTE, Each pair of Battalions form a Regiment.*

THE  
BRITISH ARMY  
IN 1875.


WITH  
SUGGESTIONS  
ON ITS  
*ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION.*

BY  
JOHN HOLMS, M.P.



LONDON:  
LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER.  
1875

231. c. 152.



## PREFACE.

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**A**S I cannot lay claim to the experience of a Military Authority, it is naturally with much diffidence that I venture to offer the following pages to the public, as my humble contribution towards the solution of a great and important question, and in the hope that business men, by the light of plain facts and the application of some sound principles, may think for themselves, and be induced to take an interest in the question of Army Reform. They will see clearly that it is neither more men nor more money that we want, but simply common sense management and sound organization.

I should greatly rejoice if I could conscientiously advocate our having no standing army at all, and agree that we should trust only to our fleet. But when we see the huge armaments of Europe, and observe the efforts Russia, France, and Germany are making to increase their fleets, and look to the work our navy might be called upon to do in connection with our possessions all over the world, which we are bound to protect, peacefully inclined as we may be, I feel that, as guardians of our own honour and safety, we cannot rely upon one line of defence only. We must therefore have our army in the very best condition possible for its size, and capable of easy expansion.

The present mal-administration of our Army is felt as keenly by most military men as it is by civilians ; indeed, they are

most generous and frank in giving civilians who choose to interest themselves in the subject all the assistance in their power. I have to thank, and have great pleasure in taking this opportunity of thanking, military men of all ranks for their great courtesy and kindness in giving me most freely information and assistance at all times.

In a country like this, where nothing but voluntary service is needed or would be endured, nothing but good can come from coöperation between military men and civilians, especially large employers of labour.

No jealousy should exist, for coöperation cannot but be beneficial to both.

Much as civilians may now watch our War Department and wish to see it reformed I am sure it is as much the desire and



interest of military men to obtain sound reform in that Department, for they feel the discredit which now rests upon our Army Administration, and the danger of allowing the evils complained of to continue.

Bad as the condition of our Army now is, it would not be so alarming if it were not for exaggerated statements put forth recently, and apparently with authority, of such a character as indicate that the War Department is still blind to the real position in which our Army is.

This is no party question; it rises high above party feeling, and in a spirit above party feeling I earnestly hope that it may be treated, and that soon the condition of the British Army may be made worthy of its ancient renown.

## I.

DISAPPOINTING RESULTS OF THE ARMY RE-ORGANIZATION SCHEME OF 1871-72.—THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY OF 1875 WORSE THAN THAT OF 1870.—IMPORTANT THAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD TAKE AN INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION.—ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE, SHOWING THAT OUR MILITARY SYSTEM IS UNSOUND.—OBJECT OF THE PRESENT PAMPHLET.—NEITHER MORE MONEY NOR MORE MEN WANTED.—A MORE PRACTICAL SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION NECESSARY.—POWER AND CAPACITY OF THE NATION GENERALLY IN THIS RESPECT.—DIFFICULTY IN INDUCING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO TAKE AN INTEREST IN THE QUESTION.—THE PUBLIC MISLED BY MEANINGLESS PHRASES ON MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

IF, after all the grand promises made and great expenditure incurred in 1871-72 in what was fondly called "the reorganization of the British Army," the whole scheme should prove to be a sham and a delusion, the feeling of the nation would surely be one of bitter disappointment.

Now, when the country might reasonably have expected to see the blemishes of the old system

gently passing away, and to experience some of the promised advantages of the new system, what do they find to be the result? Why this, that the Army of 1875 is worse in nearly every respect than was the Army of 1870. Nay, more: they also see that the scheme of reorganization having been founded upon utterly unsound principles, we have (as I earnestly declared at the time we should) wasted three or four precious years and incurred an expenditure of thirteen millions of pounds sterling—eight and a half of it very wisely in the abolition of purchase, but four and a half of it very foolishly—£3,500,000 for Brigade Depôts, with an annual charge of £100,000 to £120,000, more than equal to another £1,000,000 of capital.

And who is now accountable to the nation? Not one of the authors of the scheme is now in the House of Commons, nor, indeed, can the present House of Commons be called to account. It was the work of a Parliament now dissolved.

Surely it is time that the public was prepared to take an active interest in this subject. It is in every respect one of the most momentous that

could engage their attention, and it calls loudly for the immediate and thoughtful consideration of every class of the community. But some say that, before the attention of the public can be thoroughly arrested and fixed intelligently upon the subject of Army Reform, we must as a nation suffer some great disaster. I say, Heaven forbid! Have we not already, indeed, suffered something like a serious disaster? We have wasted four years' time, incurred a useless expenditure equal in amount to the combined charge for the Ashantee War and the Alabama Claims, and sustained besides a loss of prestige in the eyes of all Europe.

Let our authorities openly and honestly avow that the Reorganization Scheme has utterly failed, and not seek to hide the wretched condition in which our armies, both Home and Indian, are, and then let Parliament, without too much strife of words, deal in a common-sense and business-like manner with the grave and serious difficulties which surround this question. Until this be done, everything will remain in confusion and uncertainty.

Day by day evidence accumulates which shews that the principles upon which our military system rest, are utterly unsound. But for the political changes, which took place in the early part of last year, the subject no doubt would have engaged the attention of the House of Commons during the last session. As the present Government succeeded to office very suddenly, it was perhaps too much to hope or to expect that they would be prepared with any definite opinions or plans. The nation has now, however, a right to look to those charged with the responsibility of administering our military affairs, for a clear statement of the measures they propose to adopt, for rescuing our Army from the slough of despond which threatens to engulf it.

The spasmodic attempts which have hitherto been made, to reorganize our military forces have failed, I believe, mainly because undertaken too hastily, and while those responsible for them, were in a large degree ignorant of our actual condition and requirements. They have suffered also from the lack of knowledge and interest manifested on

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the subject on the part of that section of the public in this country which usually rough hews all great measures of progress and improvement—I mean the manufacturing, commercial, and business classes of the country. A variety of causes have operated to induce these classes to leave military questions alone, and the result has been that one of the most important departments of the State has been left under the almost uncontrolled guidance of officialism.

As the whole question must soon be fully discussed in Parliament, it has been suggested to me, that if the public were supplied with a plain and succinct statement of facts, with respect, in the first place, to the present condition of our military forces, and second, with regard to the reforms, improvements, and economies which might readily be effected, they would be placed in a better position to think for themselves, and take a real interest in the subject.

Hence the following pages.

I have had evidence placed before me, amply sufficient to show, that while we ourselves shut our

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eyes to the influences which so paralyze our military administration and altogether refuse to understand our real position, our Continental neighbours are a great deal more observant. They thoroughly understand the condition of our Army, about which they have from time to time complete reports, especially since the very candid confession made by Mr. Gathorne Hardy last March, when for the first time he spoke officially of the Army, and said—

“ Our Army is not one that threatens any human being, either on the Continent or anywhere else, and if we were involved in a war in which it became necessary to send our Army abroad—and I hope no such accident will occur—it must then be regarded merely as the nucleus of the Army which it would be necessary to raise if it had to compete with those on the Continent.”\*

\* That our Continental neighbours are observant cannot be doubted. When in Berlin, a few years ago, a friend with whom I was in conversation about the Prussian Army, pointed over to the War Office of Berlin, and said—“ There they know as much about every road and lane, river and stream of your Southern Counties as you know yourselves.”

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I have no sympathy whatever, let it be clearly understood, with a policy which would involve us in the foolish and extravagant rivalry in which the great military powers of Europe are at present engaged. We can never hope—and, I trust, do not desire—to compete with them in numbers. Nor is there any necessity that we should. What the British people require, and what they really desire to have, is an army the very best in Europe for its size—sufficiently strong, to guarantee our own safety at home, and maintain the security of our vast empire scattered throughout the world. To obtain this, WE NEITHER REQUIRE MORE MEN, THAN WE RAISE, NOR MORE MONEY THAN WE SPEND UPON OUR ARMY. What we do want is a better class of men, and a more sound and practical system of organization.

We have the most intelligent and industrious population in Europe to draw our recruits from ; and I, for one, have the most unbounded faith, in their British pluck and courage ; besides, we have the finest plant in the world for producing warlike weapons and stores of every kind, and really



organization and administration of our military forces is essentially akin to the organization and administration of the vast manufacturing establishments of the nation.

No nation can boast of possessing anything like the same amount of capacity in this direction as we do. In manufactures, in commerce, and in all industrial enterprises, our competition is everywhere dreaded. At home or abroad we carry all before us. In a word, organization may be said to be the very genius of the nation, and the vast manufacturing establishments of this country, amply testify, that our successes are mainly due to that sound system by which the maximum result is attained at the minimum expenditure of cost in production.

Why, then, should the administration of our military affairs, show such a lack of this talent, and why should the British Army occupy its present humiliating position?

It is a melancholy fact, to which my attention has been drawn, that so little interest is taken in military questions, and so indifferently are they

understood "in the House of Commons, that when a debate and division took place upon the Reorganization Scheme of the late Government, a considerable number of members declined to vote, or, what was still worse, a large number blindly followed the Minister of the day into the division lobby.

The public are also at all times liable to be misled by officials and others, making statements from time to time that are expressed in popular, old-fashioned phrases, such as these—

"The British Army is now composed of the same material as that which constituted the Army of Wellington," or that "the British Army will ever be found to do its duty in the future as it has done in the past." These are simply meaningless absurdities. Nor can the complaints which are now made of the condition of our forces, be satisfactorily met by the hackneyed retort "that at all times the Service has been declared by some to be going to the dogs." An enlightened public opinion would put the proper value on such phrases

## II

EXTENT AND EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN WARFARE INAUGURATED IN 1866.—ORIGIN OF THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY SYSTEM.—ITS IMPORTANT RESULTS.—CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THIS COUNTRY A SUCCESS.

**B**EFORE the present position of our Army can be fairly understood, it is essential that two things be thoroughly apprehended. First: That a complete revolution of the military systems of European nations was brought about by the Austro-Prussian war of 1866—a revolution as thorough and as comprehensive as that effected in manufacturing textile fabrics by the introduction of the power-loom, or in travelling by the substitution of fifty-mile-an-hour locomotives for stage-coaches.

The second point, that requires to be understood is, what was the exact condition of our mili-

tary forces in 1870, and the effect of the changes made in 1870, '71, and '72.

I will now consider briefly the extent and effect of the revolution which has taken place in the military systems of European nations since 1866. In that year every one was astonished, at the rapidity with which Prussia called together her great army, and poured it upon Austrian territory. Although Prussia had then been at peace virtually for half a century, the organization of her military forces was perfect, with the exception of the artillery, and this weakness was at once so completely remedied that by 1870 it was at least made clear that it was superior to the artillery of France, which had up till then been regarded as the first in Europe. After the Battle of Sadowa, in 1866, many of the European powers made changes more or less important in their military systems. But the events of the war of 1870, which are still fresh in our minds, staggered all Europe. They caused nearly every nation to enquire carefully into its position, and to consider the cause of the extraordinary supremacy manifested by the

German army. It became quite clear, that the source of this supremacy, was to be traced back to the Napoleonic epoch. In 1807 Napoleon forced the Prussian government to limit their standing army to forty-two thousand men.

But this restriction, which was intended to cripple and curb the military power of Prussia, was ingeniously evaded by the adoption of the short service system. Forbidden to maintain a large standing army, the Prussian people were coerced, in a manner, into the adoption of what has proved to be the most efficient, the most moral, and the most economical military system which has yet been devised. No sooner were her recruits trained to be efficient soldiers, than they were allowed to go home on furlough during peace. The home ties and associations formed by a young man, were therefore never broken. The result, as we have seen, has been that while maintaining a comparatively small standing army, Prussia has been enabled to train and organize a military force which proved more than a match for the powerful military nation which had imposed upon

her this arbitrary condition. The more carefully the military system of Prussia is examined, the more clearly will it appear that she has acted in this matter of military organization on plain practical common-sense principles, and it will be found that conscription has really very little to do with the economy resulting therefrom.

Two most important results Prussia thus achieved—economy in peace, and great strength and efficiency in war.

Before pointing out the leading practical principles of the Prussian system, I desire to remark that the experience of that nation, establishes this fact, that while the practice of passing young men of twenty years of age through the Army in two or three years gives her at all times a reliable force, it also sends them back to civil life, greatly improved physically and not less moral. Military service, as it is now enforced in Prussia, does not prevent a young man of three-and-twenty from marrying, and the same may now almost be said of the military service of France. If called out in time of war, a man is not likely to fight any the

worse because he has led a moral life and has a wife and children to defend. This moral strength gave no small advantage to the Germans when fighting in 1870 against the old celibate Army of France.

I will now state what appear to me the chief conditions which recent experience has proved to be necessary, and which, modified according to its own special circumstances and requirements, must guide every European nation which has either respect for morality or any desire or regard for efficiency and economy.

First.—That as wars are now quickly declared, and almost as quickly concluded, half-trained troops are a mere deception—an encumbrance to an Army in the field rather than an aid.—War between Prussia and France was declared at 9 a.m. on the 13th July, 1870. In 51 days Sedan fell—viz., on the 2nd September following.

Second.—That as three years is acknowledged to be the outside term required to make an efficient soldier in any arm of the Service, it is in the interests of the men, and of the nation, that after

such a period of service (except in the case of service in India or the Colonies), men should retire from the ranks upon furlough. This is a most essential point under a voluntary system of service like our own, in which one man with the colours costs as much as four or five men upon furlough.

Third.—That as an Army to be worthy of the name must be composed of a fair proportion of each arm of the service,\* it is as essential under a voluntary system of enlistment, as under compulsory service, that the periods of enlistment should be uniform.

Fourth.—That as a short service and furlough system demand at once from a recruit the heaviest work (the first six or nine months' drill being always the heaviest and most irksome) the age of recruits should not be less than twenty years.

Fifth.—That a system of Army Corps, or in other words a series of small armies, each perfect in itself, is the most simple and economical

\* See Chart of Composition of an Army Corps, fronting title-page.



organization for any military force, and more particularly for the Army of a nation like this which possesses great dependencies and numerous colonies.

Sixth.—That well-defined responsibility from the Commander-in-Chief down to the subaltern is essential.

Seventh.—That as a General cannot be made without drill, any more than soldiers can be made without training, it is necessary, by means of autumn manœuvres between distinct army corps, that commanding officers should have an opportunity of testing their own skill, so that the authorities and the nation may know upon whom, in case of war, they can best rely.

These conditions are clear and simple, and are being acted upon, more or less, at the present moment by Russia, Holland, Denmark, Austria, Italy, and France. Visiting France the other day, I was astonished to see the complete change which has already taken place in the stamp of the men now in the ranks. The old celibate military system of France is at an end. The recruits are

taken young, and as soon as they are efficiently trained, are allowed to go back to their ordinary occupations, after a service, nominally of five, but, practically, of three years. By the year 1880 all the European powers I have named will have armies vastly stronger than those which they possessed in 1870. Our own, on the contrary, unless immediate and thorough reforms are instituted, promises to be very much weaker.

NOTE.—It may interest many here to remark that the Prussian military system of to-day is apparently modelled upon that of the Romans. Citizens between the same ages—17 to 42—were liable to be called up for military service, and the army was divided into legions, or army corps. In each legion there were cavalry and three classes of infantry—the *Hastati*, consisting of young men in the prime of life and forming the first line of battle; the *Principes*, or men in the vigour of life, who occupied the second line, and the *Triarii*, old soldiers of approved valour, who formed the third line.

### III

THE WARNING OF 1866 NEGLECTED.—FEEBLENESS OF OUR MILITARY FORCE IN 1870.—ITS ENORMOUS COST.—PANIC LEGISLATION OF 1870.—LORD CARDWELL'S SCHEME OF RE-ORGANIZATION.—ITS HERMAPHRODITE CHARACTER.—COMPETITION FOR RECRUITS BETWEEN LINE AND MILITIA.—NEGLECT OF THE RESERVE FORCE.—THE SCHEME OF LOCALIZATION ADOPTED.—ITS INAPPLICABILITY TO THIS COUNTRY.—NUMBER OF RECRUITS ANNUALLY REQUIRED UNDER LORD CARDWELL'S SCHEME.

I NOW propose to consider the second point—namely what was the position of our military forces in 1870, and what did we then do?

Although we had, like all the rest of Europe, a warning in 1866, the remedial measures we then adopted, amounted to very little. We formed two small reserve forces, but practically they came to nothing. In 1870, therefore, we had perhaps greater reason than any other nation in Europe to feel that our position was exceedingly feeble and unsatisfactory. So much was this the case

that it is admitted, that we could not then have sent 40,000 men out of the country capable of competing with almost any European Army. The internal condition of our military forces, was at the same time most discreditable, and the country was startled to find, that it paid an enormous sum of money for very trifling results. We were spending from fourteen to fifteen millions annually, and yet we were without anything like a reliable force to show for it. We had a crowd of men, but really no Army. The nation at the same time saw Prussia spending annually ten to eleven millions sterling, but with an organization which enabled her to call into the field in a fortnight an Army of 940,000 highly-trained men! Still more, it became also evident that through long neglect of our Indian forces we really had two armies to reform, both in respect to efficiency and economy, for our expenditure upon our combined military forces not only was, but is a scandal, and as regards India, it is positively a grave danger.

In 1870 the united cost of our Home and Indian Armies was about £34,000,000 sterling,

while the cost of the combined hosts of France, Germany, and Austria was but £32,450,000 sterling. The number of men (mostly half-trained) which we could muster did not greatly exceed one-fourth of the number maintained by these great powers.

After such startling disclosures it becomes an interesting question, what did we do?

Immediately war was declared between Germany and France in 1870, our War Department was panic struck as usual, and 20,000 more men were voted (of course raw recruits) and something like two millions of money.

In the years 1871-72 Lord Cardwell introduced his several measures for reforming the Army, some of them admirably conceived, and all, it is possible, he believed in his own mind, calculated to improve our military system. The measures which appeared to be so, were the Abolition of the Purchase system, the endeavour to get rid of the dual government of the Army, by removing the staff at the Horse Guards to the War Office, and the transfer from Lord Lieutenants of Counties to the

Minister of War, of all appointments of officers to the Militia.

These were admirable reforms, necessary to clear the ground for a complete scheme of reorganization, and they were carried through Parliament with a firm and statesmanlike hand, and with a courtesy that caused most men to give to Lord Cardwell's policy a favourable construction and consideration. But just when those who were watching all this, with interest and concern, expected to see a suitable scheme of reorganization come from the same hand, that hand became suddenly paralyzed; and temporizing and feebleness marked every step of the future. We neither adopted short service with sound arrangements for a reserve, nor did we altogether retain the old system of long service with a retiring pension. Complex as was our practice of recruiting, we had fastened upon us a scheme which was truly of the most hermaphrodite character, and which has resulted in something but little removed from absolute chaos. My readers may judge for themselves of the truth of this, by turning to the Appen-

dix, where they will find extracts from the existing recruiting regulations.\*

Under the new system, the prospect of obtaining a Reserve force, composed of a proper proportion of the different arms of the Service, is simply hopeless, seeing that the terms of enlistment range in the most uncertain manner from three to twenty-one years. It is perfectly obvious that an efficient Reserve can alone be secured by having one uniform period of enlistment for all arms.

But again, although all Europe was aroused in 1870 to the plain fact that half trained troops are really useless in war, and although we saw the Franc-Tireurs and Garde Mobile of the French, swept away, like children, before the trained soldiers of Germany ; and although we ourselves shuddered to think what might happen, under similar circumstances, to our ancient "Constitutional " force—that great county toy, the Militia—what did Lord Cardwell actually propose ? Why, to conciliate county interests, he proposed and carried that this force

\* Appendix, page 111.

should be enlarged, and its homeopathic dose of drill in the case of raw recruits increased from one month to three! It must be clear to any rational mind, with information on the subject, that recruiting for the Militia directly prevents many of the men we want from entering the Army. The Inspector-General of Recruiting, makes this remark in his report, on the 10th of January, 1871: "Recruiting for the regular Army is very injuriously affected by enlistments for the Militia." Yet at this very time and when additional recruits were wanted for the Army, Lord Cardwell, with great impartiality, resolved to increase the Militia also, and the recruiting sergeants of the two forces were sent out as usual to fight for the same men. The irony of the situation is complete, when we bear in mind, that while the recruit for the Army was supposed at the time to be more imperatively required, the recruiting sergeant of the Militia could give a bounty of ten shillings, while his competitor for the line could give nothing. What is the result? That not only does the Militia get more recruits, as shown in returns which I have pre-



pared,\* but it also appears that in this force there are 46,400 men between 19 and 25, the very ages most valuable for the Army, whilst, out of the 90,000 now in the ranks of the Line, there are but 39,900 of these ages.

At this time the country was so convinced of the weakness of our position, that had a Minister of War clearly pointed out the shortcomings of our Militia force, and firmly insisted that in future it should be composed only of trained men, who had passed through the army, he would certainly have carried all before him. Not only would he have had the support of the country, but the change would have been cordially acquiesced in, by many county gentlemen, who must be satisfied that the Militia, as at present constituted, is nothing more than a toy, and a very expensive one too, both directly and indirectly.

The absence of anything like clear and satisfactory arrangements, for the formation of an efficient reserve force, was so conspicuous in Lord Cardwell's scheme of army reorganization, that I at once came

\* Appendices, pages 124 and 122.

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to the conclusion, that there was no hope of obtaining such a force. Nothing was really done, subsequently, in this direction. The short service system, under which a reserve of trained men can alone be obtained was never carried out in its integrity, and the pay of the reserve remains at the miserable pittance of fourpence a day, an amount which never could be meant to attract good men to our service.

I think it due to myself to republish a criticism which I offered on Lord Cardwell's scheme, in the form of a note, appended to my speech in the House of Commons on this subject. It will be found in the Appendix.\*

I come now to the scheme of localization suggested by Lord Cardwell, and by which the country was mapped out into some seventy divisions, in each of which was to be placed a small barrack with a lieutenant-colonel and staff. The main purpose of this was to link the line, the militia, and other reserve forces together, and to obtain recruits. Three millions and a half of money was asked, and

\* See Appendix, page 113.

voted for the scheme; and each of the depôt centres, it may be calculated, will cost from £1,500 to £2,000 a year, additional.

All this was a gross error. The War Department here followed the Prussian model, in the only one point not applicable to this country. The points that were applicable they neglected. I will maké this plain :—

In Prussia the ground-work of their system is, to obtain men by conscription, therefore they divide the country into minute divisions, as shown in the military map now before me, so that each man may be, and is absolutely, watched from his cradle to his grave. By this means the authorities know when each man attains the age of 20, the period at which he should enter the army, and also that when on furlough, or in the Landwehr, their eyes may be upon him. But in a country like this, under a voluntary system, when by considerations of self-interest alone can we get or keep men, it was not more traps for catching recruits that we wanted, but better bait in the traps which we had.

Then when in the reserve, it is not narrow

bounds and minute localization that are needed—quite the reverse: it is localization with a large area, within which men, when on furlough, may have full scope to move about and obtain employment. And so far only is localization—with us good, it should fix an area, with wide boundaries, within which each army corps should be permanently located; and such a plan would not have entailed any cost upon the country, for I may here mention, that, by carrying out thoroughly and with decision, the system of short service and a well-paid reserve, our numbers in barracks would have been greatly diminished, and would not only have relieved us of the necessity of building new barracks, but would have left us with more accommodation than we really require. We have, at present, barrack accommodation in the United Kingdom for 130,000 men and 6,000 officers.

The foregoing is, I think, a fair statement of the measures proposed and adopted, in the years 1870-71-72, but it would be imperfectly understood without the official estimate of the number of men which would be required annually to carry their

scheme out. Fortunately these numbers were given with great clearness and exactitude, and it is an all-important point. A Commission which sat before the scheme came into operation calculated that at least 22,000 recruits were required annually. In 1870 Lord Cardwell, when introducing the Enlistment Act of that year, gave 23,000 as the requisite number. In March, 1871, Captain Vivian stated in the House of Commons that the reorganization plan of the Government, by an actuarial calculation, would require on an average, 32,449 men annually, and upon this basis, the scheme was passed. From these statements the public can at any time judge for themselves, whether recruiting in point of numbers progresses satisfactorily.

The result of Lord Cardwell's scheme, we were assured, would be that in the fourth year of its operation, we should have a reserve force of 13,674 men, which in seven years would have attained to 61,268, and in eight years to 81,811.

#### IV.

THE RESULTS OF LORD CARDWELL'S RE-ORGANIZATION SCHEME.—STEADY DETERIORATION IN THE QUALITY OF RECRUITS.—FALLING OFF IN THE NUMBER OF MEN RAISED.—INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MEN DISCHARGED AS BAD CHARACTERS.—GROWTH OF DISCONTENT AND DISSATISFACTION IN THE RANKS—STATISTICS OF DESERTIONS. — CONFLICT OF OPINION BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY AS TO THE CONDITION OF OUR ARMY.

**L**ET us now look at the actual results attained. By the light of a few facts, I hope to show what a fool's Paradise we have been living in during the past four years.

First as to quality. The number of rejections per 1,000 that are made of recruits offering themselves for enlistment, is not only a very fair test of quality, but it also shows the great cost of winnowing the weak from the strong, a process which, under a sound system of recruiting, might be almost entirely avoided. The number rejected per 1,000

in 1872 was 442. The average from 1860 to 1867 was 385, and in the ten years from 1841 to 1851 it was 335, and in the ten years from 1832 to 1841 it was only 298. And that this increased proportion of rejections was not caused by over-fastidiousness as to the quality of those whose services were retained, will be apparent from testimony worthy of consideration. First.—Captain Walter, Commanding Officer of the Corps of Commissionaires, who has done much for the old soldier, says in his report, dated 24th June, 1874: “As regards the number of dismissals (50 against 35 in the preceding year), the addition may be attributed partly to a more impartial maintenance of the Regulations, *but principally to the deplorable deterioration in the quality of the rank and file which is well known to have taken place in the last few years.*” Second.—Dr. Adams, Surgeon-Major of the London Recruiting District, when lecturing, on the 2nd of February last year, at the United Service Institution, said:—“I must candidly assert that the physique of our Infantry is not at present up to the standard of our race, and I cannot con-

“ceal from myself a feeling that, unless remedial measures be adopted at once, it will fall lower and lower.” This conclusion, Dr. Adams further stated, “had been arrived at mainly from personal inspection of about 25,000 recruits, over 17,000 of whom have passed into the Army.” Third.—Dr. Cameron, Deputy-Inspector-General of Hospitals, on the same occasion, said, “We are enlisting the very scum of society.”

In respect to the quality of our recruits, what testimony could be stronger? For myself, I can so far confirm it, by what I have recently seen at inspections of recruits, that I consider these statements not only fully borne out, but I feel I could add something more to them. This, however, I must reserve for another occasion. We talk of the recklessness of allowing unseaworthy ships to leave our ports; can it be regarded as greater than would be the foolhardiness of sending these mere striplings, to meet any trained force that might invade our shores? Surely it will not be asserted that recruiting is satisfactory as to quality.

Then in respect to numbers, the state of the case



is still worse. I have already shown that 32,449 was the average number of recruits necessary to be obtained annually, in the opinion of our military authorities, as soon as we had fairly entered upon Lord Cardwell's scheme of reorganization. Now what are the facts since the passing of the Enlistment Act of 1870 in respect to recruiting. The numbers raised in

1870 were	..	..	..	24,594
1871 „	..	..	..	23,568
1872 „	..	..	..	17,791
1873 „	..	..	..	17,194
1874 „	..	..	..	20,640

In truth, so difficult had it become to obtain men of the right stamp after this brief experience of the new system, that on November 30, 1873, our Army was short of its complement by 5,400 men, our reserve was short by 2,500, and our Militia by 20,000. These figures represent a total deficiency of 28,000 from the number voted in February of the same year, and this notwithstanding the fact that ten thousand fewer were then voted for the Militia than the previous year. I

may here remark that, if trade should prove indifferent and dull, it is not unlikely that recruiting may improve, for men out of employment will make use of the Army for a time, regarding it as a convenient mode of obtaining out-door relief. But this would really be no proof of a sound improvement in recruiting, and should have no effect upon the consideration of this grave question. And it cannot be asserted, certainly, that our recruiting, for the army, so far as quantity is concerned, is satisfactory.

Nor has the character of the Army improved under the reorganization scheme. The number of men discharged as bad characters in

1870	was	..	..	..	1,616
1871	„	..	..	..	1,032
1872	„	..	..	..	1,683
1873	„	..	..	..	2,025

while the average number of men in prison in

1870	was	..	..	..	1,288
1871	„	..	..	..	1,842
1872	„	..	..	..	1,914
1873	„	.	..	..	1,554

Again, one of the most important improvements looked for, was a reduction in the average mortality, and sickness, in our Army. Under our present antiquated system of keeping thousands of men over a long term of years in a state of enforced celibacy we have the most mischievous results. In 1872, out of an average strength of 92,218 men, the average number constantly in hospital was 3,628.

As to the influence of age on the mortality of troops in the United Kingdom I beg to refer my readers to the Appendix,\* by which it is clear that continuing the long service system as we do, we are keeping men in an enforced state of celibacy, and

\* See Appendix, page 119.

NOTE.—1872 is the last year for which we have the Army Medical Report. By its light in respect to some points of grave interest, the House of Commons is about to consider the Army Estimates for 1875. What business men will think of this I have no difficulty in judging, more especially when I state that I can have made up a clear account of the desertions for 1874 up to the 31st December. Parliament should insist upon all information about the Home Army for the past year, preceding or accompanying the Estimates. Also the actual strength of our Indian and Colonial forces, by the last report in possession of the War Department.

maintaining a direct cause of much immorality and a considerable expenditure. We have over 60,000 men (out of 180,000) in our Army who are between 30 and 40 years of age—men who might be married and domesticated citizens. The young married soldiers of Prussia—we should recollect—proved more than a match for the celibate army of France.

By the reorganization scheme we were told the Army would be made more attractive. Dissatisfaction was to diminish, if not to cease. In practice, precisely the reverse has proved to be the case. Let the facts speak for themselves. There went out of the Army by purchase in

1870	..	..	..	..	1,493 men.
1871	..	..	..	..	2,109 „
1872	..	..	..	..	2,839 „
1873	..	..	..	..	2,981 „
1874	..	..	..	..	2,653 „

But more economical means are adopted by simply deserting, and it is largely approved of, as will be found in the statistics of desertion. In my view the real measure of dissatisfaction in the

ranks is the number of men periodically advertised for as deserters ; not the net number merely who make good their escape. The men who are captured and retained in the service by force, so to speak, can hardly add to its contentment and satisfaction. The following is a statement of the number of deserters advertised for annually since the reorganization scheme came into operation :—

1870	..	..	..	..	..	4,480
1871	..	..	..	..	..	6,967
1872	..	..	..	..	..	7,653
1873	..	..	..	..	..	7,094
1874	..	..	..	..	..	6,904

It is a notable fact also that the desertions from the Artillery, an arm of the Service which it is most important should be maintained in the highest state of efficiency both at home and in India, are proportionately more numerous than from any other branch of the army. I have prepared the following figures for the purpose of showing how weak our present system is.

I will take the number of recruits who joined

the various arms of the Service in 1873, and the number advertised for as deserters from the same during that year.

	Recruits.	Deserters.
Cavalry .. ..	2,078	944
Artillery .. ..	3,479	1,868
Infantry .. ..	10,760	4,094
Engineers .. ..	443	131
Army Service Corps	194	57

And here is 1874—

Cavalry .. ..	986
Artillery .. ..	2,066
Infantry .. ..	3,641
Engineers .. ..	159
Army Service Corps .. ..	52

Then as to the promised solid, reliable reserve of trained men—there is none, and there can be none under the present arrangement.

But then the militia was to be strengthened and increased, and in 1872 we were asked to vote, and did vote 135,200 non-commissioned officers and

men. And on November 30, 1873, the whole number actually in existence was 105,000, or 28,000 less than promised. Of course, not that I think it any loss, but what impotence of purpose! Either the authorities did really mean what they said in 1872, or they did not. I leave the reader to form his own opinion.

The statistics relating to recruiting for the Militia are certainly most striking, especially when we bear in mind that all this time the Line was starving for men.

The recruits who joined the Militia numbered in

1870	..	..	18,700
1871	..	..	25,000
1872	..	..	30,000
1873	..	..	25,800
1874	..	..	29,500

There is a looseness of contract in regard to service in the Militia which leads to great freedom of action in respect to desertions in this force, and which sets all chance of maintaining good discipline at defiance. The evil grows faster in the Militia

than in the Army, moreover, as is proved by the following figures. The number of desertions from the Militia advertised for in

1870 was	..	..	3,720
1871 „	..	..	6,949
1872 „	..	..	7,663
1873 „	..	..	10,400
1874 „	..	..	10,540

In respect to the Militia, there is, fortunately, a sounder view obtaining among the intelligent and thoughtful officers of the force. They see that the present system is absolutely absurd, and is doomed, and they now speak out more freely. During the past two months I have had many communications of this kind. I observe that Col. Aikman, of R. E. Middlesex Militia, stated his experience frankly at the United Service Institution last February. He said :—

“ We recruit for the Line through the Militia.  
 “ This I believe to be wrong. It is because  
 “ the Line and the Militia are recruiting in the same  
 “ field that a sufficient number of men of proper



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“physique are not procurable, and desertions and  
“fraud are practised with impunity. When men  
“of unsettled habits make up their mind to join  
“the Army they first enlist in the Militia, and  
“receive their bounty, clothes, &c., and then  
“desert. They sell the Government property,  
“valued at £5, for what it will fetch, and then  
“enlist in the Line. Having succeeded so well,  
“they continue their migratory habits in the  
“regular service. I had 48 walk off in one morn-  
“ing; a few were caught, and sentenced by the  
“civil powers to a fine of £2 10s., or 3 months’  
“imprisonment. By this arrangement the delin-  
“quents had a balance in their favour.”\*

A Colonel of Militia, in another part of the country, who had been formerly in the Army, told me lately he would far rather hold a lower rank in a really efficient Reserve force than have his present rank in the Militia. I have now shown, by the light of incontestible facts, the steady deterioration of the Army since 1870.

\* If the 10,000 deserters from the Militia all carry away £5 worth of property each, this is no small loss in itself.

Our military administration has, beyond doubt, been gradually degenerating for the last thirty years; and although it was found to be disorganized enough in 1854, yet the Crimean War showed to the world and to ourselves that we had a splendid set of men in our ranks compared with what we have now. It is true we by the force of money scrambled through our difficulties. But it is because that since that time, we have not recognised the change going on around us in Europe, and have neglected to regard the great revolution in the social forces around us—the vast advance in the position of the agricultural labourer and the artizan of England,—we find our military system is a tangled labyrinth, and the chief aim of the officials seems to be simply to make it look pleasant. The truth is that officials at the War Department have been so long accustomed to the evils that surround them, that they have become themselves almost unconscious of the cause and extent of the disorganization which exists.

I do not blame the men altogether, but I do blame the system. We impose upon a War Minister

duties which, both physically and mentally, are very great, *and until we simplify our system by decentralization*, I fear it will be difficult for any man entering fresh upon his office at once fully to grasp the question. A minister must trust greatly to whatever he is told or to what is put into his hands ; or how, for instance, can we reconcile the language used by the Secretary of State for War in the House of Commons on the 24th February, 1873, with the statement made only 22 days before by Dr. Adams, Surgeon-Major of the London Recruiting District. Dr. Adams tells us plainly enough that the quality of our recruits is not good, and must, unless something be done, sink lower and lower, and this after an examination of 25,000 of them. The Secretary of State for War, three weeks after, in asking the House of Commons to vote the estimates, said, speaking of recruiting :—

“ You will also find that the commanding officers  
“ in almost all cases approved the recruits sent  
“ to them. The principal medical officers, after the  
“ usual monthly examinations, generally expressed  
“ the same opinion, and reported favourably, and, if

“ these recruits are to be tested by the appearance  
“ they presented in the Military Manœuvres of last  
“ autumn, a person must be fastidious indeed who  
“ was not satisfied with every branch of the British  
“ Army on that occasion.”

Could language be stronger or clearer than this of Lord Cardwell's? Can language be more convincing than that of Dr. Adams and Dr. Cameron? Both cannot be right.

But further, as regards numbers, the statement is equally perplexing. The Secretary of State for War said on the same occasion :—“ In the present month  
“ of February we did not press forward recruiting  
“ because our establishment was 4,235 in excess of  
“ the number we now ask you to provide for in the  
“ estimates, and there is, you see, no difficulty at  
“ present in keeping up our strength.”

If the establishment to the extent of 4,235 was in excess, then the clear duty of the Secretary of State was at once to have brought up the reserve to its full number, yet on the 30th November, 1873, the reserve was found to be 2,500 short, and the army, 5,400! To say the least, some one's judgment in February was not very accurate.

## V.

OUR ARMY LIKELY TO BE WORSE IN FUTURE.—DECREASE  
IN THE CLASSES OF POPULATION FROM WHICH RECRUITS  
HAVE BEEN OBTAINED.—DETERIORATION IN THE CHA-  
RACTER OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.—THEIR  
IMPORTANCE IN MAINTAINING EFFICIENCY.

**B**UT bad as the condition of our Army may now  
be, that it will become still worse is, I believe,  
inevitable, and for the following reasons:—

The two best recruiting grounds for the Army  
have hitherto been Ireland and the South Western  
and other agricultural counties of England. In  
neither of these districts have we now the same  
amount of raw material to work upon. The  
number of men available as recruits has sensibly  
diminished, and wages have largely increased. In  
Ireland these influences have already produced a  
remarkable change. While in 1860 321 out of  
every 1,000 recruits raised were obtained in Ire-  
land, in 1872 the proportion was only 72 per  
1,000. The recent agitation in the agricultural

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districts of England will unquestionably increase the difficulties of the recruiting sergeant, because the results have been a considerable amount of emigration and migration and a rise in the rate of wages. It is a fact worth noticing that whilst in 1861 the number of in-door and out-door labourers employed in agriculture in England and Wales was 1,365,000, in 1871 that number had diminished to 1,149,000, or something like 16 per cent.

We have, moreover, at the present moment, 38,000 men in the army who have seen from 15 to 21 years' service, and who, therefore, must retire in a few years. These vacancies, added to those created by the shorter term of enlistment, will create a gap which certainly cannot be filled up at the present rate at which recruiting for the Line progresses.

By a recent decision of the House of Commons no recruits can be sent to India under 20 years of age, and as we do not enlist separately for India (although if we did she would draw plenty of recruits for herself) we really send the pick of our men there.

But what, perhaps, is the most important point of all, and a matter of the greatest gravity, having regard to the future efficiency of our army, is the deterioration which is in progress in the quality of our non-commissioned officers. The serjeants used to be regarded as the backbone of the British Army, but, from the class of recruits now joining, it is daily becoming more and more difficult to obtain suitable and efficient non-commissioned officers. The same remark applies with equal force to the Militia, which relies upon the Line for a supply of men for the permanent staff.

## VI.

CLASS OF MEN REQUIRED AS RECRUITS.—THEIR NUMBER,  
AND HOW TO BE OBTAINED.—SORRY RESULTS OF OUR  
PRESENT MILITARY SYSTEM.—CONTRAST BETWEEN THE  
PRUSSIAN AND BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.—  
NUMBER OF RECRUITS REQUIRED UNDER SHORT SERVICE  
SYSTEM FEWER THAN NOW RAISED.—GREAT GAIN IN  
RESPECT TO EFFICIENCY.

**B**EFORE proceeding to explain the class of men we require and should have as recruits in the future, and how they are to be obtained, it is important, and very necessary, to determine upon the number we need. It is absurd indeed to waste time, session after session, discussing the question whether we are to vote ten thousand men, more or less, for our Army. Our foreign policy, I take it, has now been definitely pronounced, and it will be in the future, as it has now for some time been in the past, that of non-intervention.

The number of men we have had in the Army in each of the past ten years, as well as the average number for the past four years, will be found in



the Appendix,\* and I beg to refer my readers to it. A still more reliable and trustworthy guide in respect to numbers, however, is the actual strength of our forces at home on the 30th November, 1873, and of the forces in India and the Colonies on the 1st September of the same year.†

And now, as to our Home Army, which, as will be observed, is stated to be 90,469 men. Let me analyse these figures. Owing to our present vicious military system, we have something approaching 5,000 men daily in prison or in hospital. We have, moreover, a large number in the ranks who are mere boys. We cannot safely say, therefore, that in November, 1873, we had more than 80,000 out of the total 90,469 who could be regarded as really efficient and serviceable.

Now as to the Militia. When I bear in mind that at the last annual training only 74,200 answered the roll-call, and consider that the desertions from this force are proportionately even more numerous than from the Army, and are increasing

\* Appendix, page 123.

† Appendix, page 122.

in a rapid ratio,\* and when I know, as all the world knows, that the bulk of these militiamen have really had almost no training, and have acquired less discipline, I think if I reckon them to be worth 37,500 trained and efficient troops, I put, I am sure, a high valuation upon them. We had also 7,500 Reserve men, who, if they could be got at, are undoubtedly trained men. Adding these several forces together, we find the total number would be equivalent to 125,000 trained troops. This is the sorry result of all our efforts and our most monstrous expenditure. I feel confident that every business man in the country will feel ashamed when I compare the common-sense and practical military administration of Prussia, and its results, with the fatuous and feeble management of our War Department.

In 1870, Prussia had in her army 940,000 highly trained, efficient, and well disciplined men of from 20 to 32 years of age. The number of men recruited annually to maintain this force was only 100,000, while we, with a force equivalent

\* See Appendix, page 124.

but to 125,000 such troops, actually raise about 46,600 recruits annually !\* What a waste of time, of energy, and of money is represented by these latter figures !

Now as to the number which we require. What we really require, in my opinion, is 168,000 men for our Home and Colonial services—all to be enlisted for a period of seven years. Of this number, 22,000, required for our Colonial force, would serve their whole term of seven years with the colours, and receive a sum of money in hand at the end of that term in lieu of pension. Of the remaining 146,000 at home, 66,000 would be with the colours, and 80,000 on furlough. For India 60,000 men would be required, and upon the same terms as for the Colonies. The total number of men required to maintain the rank

\* As our Volunteers serve upon an average about three years and a half, something like 45,000 fresh men join annually, so that about 90,000 men in the United Kingdom offer themselves voluntarily every year for military service—nearly as many as Prussia gets by Conscription !

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and file of these forces each year would therefore be—

For Indian Service .. ..	8,600
For Colonial Service .. ..	3,000
For Home Service .. ..	20,000
	<hr/>
Total .. ..	31,600

or something like 15,000 less than the number we raise now ; a small number for our population.\*

In this manner I calculate that our foreign services would be amply provided for, and an Army of 146,000 men would be obtained for home service without trouble, and at much less cost. These men could also be of a much better stamp than those we have now to content ourselves with. The fourth year after the establishment of such a force, and every year thereafter, fifteen to twenty thousand trained men would pass into civil life. Each of these men would be equal to do soldier's duty for four or five years more, and they would ultimately constitute a powerful latent

See Appendix vi., page 126.

force which could be made available for the service of the country in a case of emergency.

The offer of a money bounty under such circumstances would no doubt be sufficient to enable us to procure as many as we could possibly require.

The knowledge that we possessed among our own population a powerful reserve of this kind would be a great source of strength in itself, and it could not fail to be regarded in the same light by European powers who would know of it from the moment we resolutely adopted it.

The scheme I have thus briefly sketched is nothing but a modification of the modern military system which every nation now feels itself compelled to adopt if it desires to keep in the front rank among modern powers. Backed by an efficient, well-trained force such as I have described, we would be infinitely stronger for defence than with half-a-dozen such antiquated and effete military forces like our Militia.

Nor need such a plan of military re-organization as this take much time in being fully developed, if adopted and carried out with energy and with

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prudence. No more official enquiries or ponderous blue books are needed. It is a plain question, which an efficient administration should at once deal with. By legislation last session the Government have now full control over the whole of our forces, and they have more money than under a reorganized system they can possibly use.

It would be imprudent to propose any sudden or violent change in the militia force which now exists ; until the reserve is made up it might be continued in its present form, but as recruiting for it would cease, the reserve men retiring from the line would meantime pass into the militia, and be drilled annually with that force. Were my suggestions adopted, the liberal terms offered would be certain to induce as many men as we would desire at once to retire into the reserve. Indeed experience shows that there is no small number of men in the ranks, who would gladly avail themselves of an opportunity of leaving the army without any such strong encouragement.

## VII.

PARAMOUNT NECESSITY OF A REFORM IN OUR MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.—DIFFICULTIES OF THE TASK.—FLEXIBILITY AND SIMPLICITY OF THE PRUSSIAN SYSTEM.—IMPORTANCE OF DECENTRALIZATION. — THE ARMY CORPS.—HOW CONSTITUTED, AND ITS ADVANTAGES.—WELL DEFINED AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY THE MAINSPRINGS OF SUCCESS.—COMPARATIVE COST OF ADMINISTRATION OF PRUSSIAN AND BRITISH ARMIES.—ECONOMY THAT MIGHT BE EFFECTED IN THE CASE OF THE LATTER.

IN the foregoing pages, I have mainly dwelt upon the causes which exist, and which prevent our obtaining the right class of men for military service. This part of the question I conceive there need not be much difficulty in dealing with. The more serious question which the country has to face, is the reform of our existing system of military administration. And, in fact, had this system been sound, it is doubtful if the question of how to get and keep good men in our service would ever have arisen.

Whoever undertakes it will find this reform no easy task. Our War Department appears to me, to be swathed and bandaged in red tape, and is surrounded with a hard crust of routine officialism, which must be broken before any good can be effected. It must be broken, and I feel from the outside, for unless Parliament and the public think for themselves, and act with determination, sound reform is hopeless. Let us obtain and keep whatever number of good men we like, without a sound system of military administration and organization, we will only deceive ourselves if we believe that we possess a reliable army. Since 1866 practical experience has most clearly shewn that mere numbers will not suffice for success. It was by sound organization and direction, that both Austria and France were overcome by Prussia. Each of the defeated nations had abundance of men, but their administration and management were most defective.

The principles under which the French Army was guided before the war of 1870 were very much like those recognised by our War Department. Centralization was the key note of the system.



The minutest details had to be decided upon, and regulated by, an overworked and distracted Minister of War, the satisfactory discharge of whose duties in time of peace was difficult, and in war impossible. Cumbersome and paralysing, they engendered confusion and weakness at the moment when it was most necessary to have everything in perfect order. The system of military administration in Prussia was the reverse of this. Its decentralization was so complete that the Minister of War had most ample time for the discharge of his duties during peace, and in the event of war he had but to telegraph to the Commanding Officer of each Army Corps one single word "Mobilize," and the important part of his work was done. We all know how soon the Prussian forces were in the field when war was declared in 1866 and 1870.

Such a system of decentralization by the division of the military forces into distinct army corps, each corps perfect and complete in itself, gives a Minister of War a distinct and confident assurance that they may be brought into the field fully

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equipped, perfect, and ready for action on the shortest notice possible; for they are complete in every arm, in transport, in control, and in every appliance of war.\*

Moreover, as such army corps are exactly like each other, whatever number may be called out, the army is proportionately the same throughout. In this manner the Prussian Minister of War could at any moment call out a military force of whatever size he might determine upon from one army corps numbering 22,514 men, without its reserves; to 56,702, with its reserves; so in gentle gradation as to number up to 940,000 men, all complete and perfect. When war was concluded, this force, whatever might be its size, was just as easily contracted.

In short, the Prussian system is so flexible, and

\* With us the control is in the hands of civilians, of whom the combatant officer is not very tolerant, an intolerance which, on the other hand, is resented by the control officer, a condition of things exceedingly unsatisfactory, where all should be arranged so as to be harmonious, and each arm and department working in perfect accord and for the common good.

so completely under control, that, like an umbrella, it can be expanded when required, at the will of him who holds the staff, and closed immediately the need has passed away. In our case, our umbrella is inflexible. It has no joints; no one hand holds the staff, and although it is small we cannot close it; it is never in the best of order when needed, and its maintenance is most expensive.

The question arises how is this flexibility in the Prussian service produced? The answer is simple. Through the Army Corps system. The General at the head of each Army Corps has supreme power over it in every respect—feeding, clothing, training, exercising, and maintaining it in readiness to take the field. He receives from the War Department only two things—money and cloth; and to all intents and purposes he is an independent chief, subject only to a very general control.

With this power, however, he has associated corresponding responsibility—he is answerable for everything; for the state of his corps in peace, for its readiness to take the field, for the state of its

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supplies, the condition of its field waggons, &c., &c. Similarly every one under him has a certain authority, within which he acts with corresponding responsibility.

Nearly every man in each army corps is known to another, and each arm of the service is accustomed to work in harmony with the other. They are ready to go into action in a few days' notice, with everything complete, down even to the drugs required in the field. As an illustration, when in Prussia some time ago, seeking to understand their system, I visited the several barracks of an Army Corps and its depôt, at which in time of peace are stored all the waggons required in the field. Nothing could be more business-like and systematic than the arrangements. The Major in charge produced his book, showing the waggons, &c., under his care. In all they numbered 285, and amongst them were large medical waggons—the Apothecaries' Halls of the field, if I may so term them—and smaller ones, which might be compared to dispensing shops. Both were fitted with every appliance and requirement ready for immediate

use, except, of course, actual medicine, for each sort of which, however, there was a distinct receptacle marked with its name, and on an order being received to mobilize, it is the doctor's duty to see that everything is provided and in perfect order.

Each Army Corps, then, constitutes an army in itself, and its proper and efficient management is the business of the General at its head. The competition between Commanding Officers in respect to efficiency and economy exercises a most wholesome influence. Moreover, autumn manœuvres between the different Army Corps are regularly engaged in; they serve to test, not only the capacity of the Generals in command, but also the efficiency of the forces, and the public have a clear notion of what they are paying for, and whether they have their money's worth.

Clear and well-defined authority and responsibility are the mainsprings of the Prussian system of administration. A more practical, earnest body of men than the Prussian officers I have not come in contact with. Every Captain is as anxious about the efficiency of his Company as the General

is about that of his Army Corps. The eye of the superior Commanding Officer is over all, for his own credit and reputation are dependent upon the good work done by all under him.

The General does not care how often the Captain may have his men out, provided he shows good results. Here a Captain would be stared at if he proposed to have his men out on his own account, so that he might bring them well up in drill.

I do not for a moment desire it to be thought that our officers are not both able and willing to do all that is required of an officer either in Prussia or anywhere else. On the contrary, in many cases I know that they only wish they had such opportunities and were supplied with better men. I feel confident that no men in the country have greater reason to deplore the present condition of our Army, or a more earnest desire to see a sounder system introduced than our officers.

An Army Corps is, to a well-organized military force, exactly what a department is to a large wholesale business house. An efficient and well-paid man is put at the head of it, with ample

power and authority, and he is expected to show good results. Without some such arrangement, what opportunity would the head, either of an army or a commercial establishment, have for general supervision, and for considering and determining a definite policy. And this is administration. Let us suppose the head of a large business devoting himself to the details of one huge department—buying and selling some thousands of petty articles. The confusion that would certainly follow would be just such as we now see in the case of our military administration. Or let us take the case of a large manufacturing establishment, without a sound sub-division into departments with perfect and well-defined responsibility, and with every detail dependant upon the head of the firm ; and add, also, this further consideration that the head of the firm is continually being changed, and rarely, if ever, has any practical knowledge of the business. Throw in, besides, the fact that a large proportion of the work-people are continually running away, others are told off to catch them, another set are employed to hang about public-houses to cajole a

fresh lot to accept your employment, while five per cent. of the whole are constantly either in prison or in hospital. What, I ask, would be the natural fate of a commercial business conducted after this fashion? Why, of course, bankruptcy would be speedy and inevitable. Yet this is a true picture of the business of our Army as it is now conducted. It is undoubtedly the absence of a sound and sensible system of organization in our military system that has made its demands upon our national exchequer prove so insatiable. It is costly in time of peace, and ever unready in time of war, the bare idea of which always puts the authorities at the War Office in a panic, and no wonder.

In order that business men may easily and clearly understand what an Army Corps is, I have placed fronting the title-page a chart, showing the composition of an Army Corps, the numbers and composition of which were prepared for me by a military friend of great knowledge and ability, as the most suitable for the requirements of our small Army. He took the large force of 10,780 combatants as being about the least number that would



be marshalled in a Division. A Division is the usual conventional word taken to mean a force of men in which the four arms—Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers—are all represented.

By this chart, business men will see how little mystery there is in understanding the condition of any army founded upon sound organization; let a man understand one Army Corps and he understands readily everything else, and would be in a position to judge of the condition and cost of our Army more easily than he can understand that of almost any other of our institutions.

To organize is to construct so that one part co-operates with another, and that well-defined responsibility attaches to every man. This, at a glance, will be seen to be the case on reference to the chart referred to.

The Lieut.-General at the head of the Army Corps is responsible for everything of every kind; the Major-Generals of each Division are his right and left hands, each being responsible for his Division. They each looking to their three

Brigadiers, who are responsible for the Infantry and Cavalry, and to two officers of their Staff, viz., the Lieut.-Colonels of Artillery and of Engineers, who are responsible for their respective Arms; and so, from the Lieut.-General down to the drummer-boy, all are connected, and the responsibility of each officer is clearly and well defined.

It will be seen also that an Army Corps system requires a certain proportion of each Arm, so that enlistment should be, for, as nearly as possible, the same term of years, so as to maintain a regular flow of men into each Arm from the outside, and a regular flow from it to Furlough or Reserve.

With us, each Army Corps having a well defined but not too narrow localization, should have all the duty and responsibility of recruiting for itself, and of looking after and paying its men on furlough; and so making our reserve a reality, each Army Corps would be in wholesome competition the one with the other.

Valuable as this system is to the army of any country, and every country is adopting it, it is especially so in the case of our own, with its

numerous colonies and dependencies, which at any time might call for a small or large number of men. To supply either the Army Corps system is perfect.

As each Army Corps manages its own affairs, very little is left for the War Department to do but to maintain a general supervision and control.

At the War Office at Berlin in 1870, some 268 men managed the whole of their large army at a cost of £51,739, whereas our small army was mismanaged by 568 persons at Pall Mall, and at a cost, that same year, of £170,000.

The whole cost of the War Office and Control Department in Berlin was only £170,000. The cost of the same department with us was £568,000, and to which it had steadily grown from £269,000 in 1853.

Reorganized upon an Army Corps system, such as I advocate, the cost of administration should not be more, I find, than £122,000, making a liberal allowance for everything.

## VIII.

REMEDIES.—THE PENSION SYSTEM AND LONG SERVICE CONDEMNED.—MEN NOW VALUE IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGES.—THE SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM.—ITS ADVANTAGES.—CREATION OF AN EFFICIENT RESERVE FORCE.—INCREASE OF PAY.—A DEFINITE NUMBER OF COMMISSIONS TO BE ANNUALLY DISTRIBUTED IN THE RANKS.—RESERVE MEN TO BE PREFERRED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.—COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE POLICE AND OUR LEADING RAILWAY COMPANIES.—ABUNDANCE OF RECRUITS FOR THE TWO LATTER SERVICES.—IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONDITION OF THE PRIVATE SOLDIER.

**B**EFORE proceeding to point out the remedies which appear to me should be applied to our military system, I would say that they are not to be found in a return to our old and *effete* system of long service and a pension—indeed were long service compatible with a sound organization, the pension system has utterly lost its attraction. Not only are the desertions now greater from those arms of the service that are for long service and a pension ;

but as one amongst other incontestible proofs that the prospect of a pension has ceased to be an inducement, I would point out that the Inspector General of Military Prisons, in his report for the year 1873, states that the increase of desertion among old soldiers—that is to say, among men who have served for 15 years and upwards—is very marked, the proportion being 8.6 per cent. for that year, compared with the 2.2 for the year before. These men, therefore, although they have served in the ranks until a pension might be said to be within their grasp, found outside attractions to be so much stronger, that they did not hesitate to sacrifice it.

Nothing can be clearer than that in the present day men would value more highly an almost immediate advantage, such as could be offered to them by high pay for a few years in a Reserve, after being three years in the Army, than a deferred pension coming after 21 years, when they had forgotten their trade, and to whom 1s. a day in such circumstances would be almost a mockery, whilst, of course, for modern warfare, they would be useless to the State as soldiers. In no commodity does

the axiom, "that a good article is the cheapest," show itself more clearly than in the case of a military force, whether it be intended for defence or for offence; but this does not seem to be even recognised by those who should long since have discovered it. I have for years said that we must apply to the engagement of men for the Army precisely the same common-sense principles which all employers of labour adopt, and then we will get men of good character to join the ranks of the Army.

The separate enlistment for our Home and Indian and Colonial Army will give us a greatly-increased choice of men, for a better class of men will come forward, who would never have thought of coming when there was no choice of service given to them. And ceasing to recruit for the Militia, the Army will get the pick of the agricultural labourers, and as, by the sound system I am advocating, we will only require 32,000 recruits annually, instead of 47,000, as at present, we can afford to be careful as to character.

The first thing which every employer asks is the

character of the man applying for employment. It is the last thing the War Department ever thinks of asking for—indeed, it is never asked at all, and that is one of the great reasons why respectable men shun it; is it very likely that respectable men will join a force when character goes for nothing, and has caused the very name of soldier to be regarded as a social stigma? The road into the Army is much too easy; the legitimate way out of it much too difficult.

Our Army has sunk so low that, in order to regenerate it, we should at first offer attractive terms, until we lift it to such a position as that to belong to our Army will be regarded as being as honourable as to belong to the Customs, Excise, Post Office, or any similar State service; and with a reserve system this is essential, as a reserve force can only be safe if the men composing it are reliable men in regular work in the country, and to be depended upon during the four years they are on furlough. The four years, then, when they are on furlough should be the very pivot of our system, and men in it should be paid such a sum as would

give a reasonable guarantee that we would get them when wanted. Therefore I would propose :

First.—That in our system of enlistment we must recognise the principle of short service of not more than two or three years with the colours ; thus following the cardinal principle which many European nations are adopting in their military organization. Men during the four years they are in the Reserve should be paid £20 a year—or, at first, even £30—and be called out, say, for a week at Easter, so as not to interfere with their occupation, and for which they should be paid a pound. In Prussia reserve men are rarely called out at all ; with us, however, it would be wise to call men out this short time once a year, until the system was fairly established. The payment of their retaining fee of £20 should, for obvious reasons, be made at irregular times, but with due notice, say four times a year, and always with a certificate from the employers with whom they are engaged, so that there would be a guarantee for their forthcoming when wanted.



Second.—We should raise the pay of all non-commissioned officers and men by something like 4d. or 6d. a day.

Third.—Let a certain number, *but a fixed and determinate number*, whatever it may be, of *commissions in the Army*, be every year awarded to Non-commissioned Officers by competition, which commission, when obtained, should be accompanied with £50 of annual pay more than the usual pay of those Officers who had not risen from the ranks; thus making his new position one of a satisfactory character, and not, as at present, one frequently of discomfort; and thus, at an infinitesimal cost to the state, giving a solid attraction to good men.

Fourth.—Let every man who has served his seven years—*i.e.*, three with the Colours and four in the Reserve—have the first right before all others of employment in all Government service for which he can show himself fitted.

With such advantages, in a short time the whole character of our Army would change, and we would get men for the British Army as good as flock to the British Police, and at a cost such as

would bear reasonable comparison with other well-managed forces, military or civil. The Police Force of the United Kingdom in 1872 numbered 43,648 men. The total cost—including clothing and accoutrements, costing £5 18s. 9d.—was £3,650,484, and they had neither difficulty in getting men, nor in keeping them.

The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, in his report for 1873, states that “the class of recruits seeking employment in the force during the year has been above the average, and they have been enlisted in sufficient numbers to fill the vacancies.” So much for getting men. Then as to keeping them, they have practically no desertions, and “the number of voluntary resignations show a marked decrease from 383 in 1872 to 216 in 1873.” Facts like these speak for themselves; but then look at the Customs, Excise, and Post Office; they have no difficulty in getting and keeping men. A short time ago some score of postmen were wanted, at salaries of from 18s. to 20s. a week, and a thousand well-dressed young men appeared. Again look at some of our great railway com-

panies ; see what their position is as employers of labour, and they have to manage a business far more intricate, and requiring far more administrative ability than our Army, and it must be managed, not only to the satisfaction of the public, but to the profit of the shareholders.

The number of persons employed at from 15s. or 18s. to 60s. a week by

The Midland Railway Company	is about.	..	28,000
The Great Northern	„	„	.. 10,000
The Great Western	„	„	.. 7,000

The Midland employs as many men as about a third of the whole of our Home Army ; yet, as a rule, not only have they no difficulty in getting men, but in keeping them, for 60 or 70 per cent. remain permanently with them, and the men who enter their service are generally of the age of from 21 to 27—the very class who, by a little arrangement, would willingly serve in the Army for three years, from 20 to 23 years of age, and go to railways and other companies during the four years they were in the Reserve, at the very

age suitable for both parties, and the men would be by their training and discipline the most valuable such employers could obtain, and would be sought for by corporations, parochial authorities and all kinds of employers requiring trustworthy men; and their having such situations would be a guarantee that they might be found when wanted. And what recruiting sergeant would be equal to these men having their £20—merely as a retaining fee—over and above the wages of their comrades who had not served in the army, and having, moreover, the preference over all others—after this four years—in any vacant Government appointment which they could prove themselves capable of filling?

Within a few years we would have the choice of the best of men for our purpose, and it would be self-acting, for men would flock to us. A voluntary system of enlistment, well managed, should give us the finest Army in Europe for its size, selection can be so thoroughly made; whereas, by a conscription system, out of fairness to others, all must be taken who are any way near the mark;

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and in no country of Europe is a Reserve system so suitable as in our own, if managed with ordinary prudence, and at the same time at a great reduction from our present monstrous expenditure, which is quite as disgraceful to us as the present dissatisfaction in the ranks.

I come now to my fifth suggestion.

Fifth.—In my opinion, if we could shorten the period of three years with the colours safely, it would be an advantage both to the State and to the soldier. In Prussia, although three years was the nominal period of service with the colours, yet in deference to the opinion strongly expressed in 1862 in their Parliament, that two years should be the period, in all cases where they found the recruit understood his work and duties, they allowed him to go home at the end of two years, and last year, or the year before, the Prussian Parliament fixed two years and three months for the infantry, and three years for other arms as the period of service.

Now I see that the first six or nine months of a recruit's life is the most trying and irksome to him, for it is then he goes through his training,

a process the most of which he could go through in private life before offering himself if he liked ; in other words, if he came a partly manufactured soldier, we should take him, paying him for his value ; if, for instance, he came trained equal to all we could have given him in three months, pay him its value ; if he came trained equal to six months, pay him its value—easily reckoned, but certainly cheap to the state at £10 and £20 respectively, to be paid to him at the end of his service with the Colours—and in each case of course his time with the colours would be proportionately reduced ; indeed, a very intelligent man coming fully trained, would, with one year's discipline, be a perfect soldier, and in this country we have no end of old soldiers who could give lessons in drill, and our Volunteers would be a most valuable agency in this respect, but to this I will by-and-bye refer. That business men may clearly see the force of my suggestion, I would state that training and discipline are two distinct things. Training, or drill, means the rough manufacturing of the soldier

up to a certain point, when discipline begins. With discipline he begins to know and respect his officers, to learn patience, and to submit with obedience; he also knows and works with other soldiers, and this training and discipline is the complete formation of the soldier. This would be a self-acting system, and of mutual advantage to the soldier and to the state.

And now my sixth and last suggestion.

Sixth.—In place of spending any more money on Brigade Depôts, let us make use of the unspent money in putting existing barracks into a very comfortable condition as to furniture and appliances, and in providing suitable apartments for Non - Commissioned Officers and their wives. With a little judgment and very moderate expenditure this could be done, and the headquarters of each Army Corps, where its recruits would come to, would be made comfortable and attractive.

## IX.

OUR VOLUNTEER FORCE.—MERITS MORE ENCOURAGEMENT.  
—ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE MILITIA, BUT  
MIGHT BE UTILISED LIKE THE MILITIA IN CASE OF  
WAR.—COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA AND  
THE VOLUNTEERS.—THEIR RESPECTIVE COST.

I NOW propose to offer a few remarks upon our Volunteer force. I have always regarded with favour measures which would tend to maintain, improve, and encourage our Volunteers. For expressing this opinion in the House of Commons a charge of inconsistency has been brought against me. I have been accused of seeking to abolish the Militia, and at the same time maintain the Volunteers. A little reflection, I think, will show that there is such a wide difference between the two forces that such a charge is altogether groundless.

Before the Volunteer force was established, the Militia was called upon, in the event of war, and in the absence of regular troops, to perform many



of the duties usually discharged by the soldiers of the line. If we invaded a foreign country, as was the case during the Crimean War, they performed garrison duty at home, and in other ways they made themselves useful. But all such services could now, and would, under similar circumstances, be as well and as efficiently discharged by our Volunteers. Since the Volunteer force was organized in 1859, the special occupation of the Militia, therefore, has practically gone. Our Volunteers, moreover, do not in any way interfere with the supply of recruits for the line, whereas the Militia, as I have previously pointed out, does. Our Volunteer Force is composed of men who, both for physique and intelligence, are above the class from which the ranks of the Line and the Militia are usually recruited. Were a little prudence exercised, however, our Volunteers might be made available to a valuable extent in supplying that superior class of men to the Army which we are all so anxious to see it possess. This might be attained by our giving a bonus to recruits according to their proficiency in drill. A Volun-

teer, I will suppose, enlists for the Line, and it is found on examination that he has anticipated his drill, say by six months. In a word, he is a ready-made soldier up to that point, and for that we should be prepared to pay him a bonus of £20, and an additional £5 to the funds of the Volunteer regiment from which he came; and of course his term with the colours would be proportionately reduced. Such a system would be self-acting, and productive of many advantages. It would be economical to the State, and it would be advantageous to the Volunteer Force and to the recruit himself.

Our Volunteers, since their establishment, have proved to be steady and persevering. They rank among their number some of the best rifle shots in the world. With the numerous good Sergeant-Instructors they possess, we might soon obtain from their ranks such a number of men as would greatly improve our regiments of the line. To these men we might confidently look for a supply of efficient non-commissioned officers.

This would constitute the kind of feeding which

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our Army really requires, and would be very different indeed from the spurious system which now prevails of supplying the line with the worst of our Militiamen.

Our Volunteers, moreover, should be further encouraged by the War Department. Drill grounds and shooting ranges might be supplied to them, as also additional articles of clothing and accoutrements.

The efficiency and value of our Volunteers as a military force may be judged of by an official return which I have placed in the Appendix.\* It shows that out of a total number of men enrolled of 175,000, no fewer than 161,000 passed as efficient, while 140,000 were present at the annual official inspection in 1874. Let us look for a moment at the composition of this force. It embraces no fewer than 30,800 efficient Artillerymen, and I have reason to know that among these Artillerymen are some of the best and most intelligent mechanics to be found in the country. These men would be invaluable either for garrison

\* Appendix VII., page 127.

duty in the event of war, or for coöperation with the 18,000 Artillerymen we possess in the Army. Artillery is an arm of our military service which is daily growing in importance, and it is satisfactory to find that it forms such a large proportion of our Volunteer force. As far as efficiency is concerned, I am satisfied that after a short practice they would compete on an equal footing with the artillery of the line.

The Engineers also are composed of much the same class of men, and the efficient numbered no fewer than 5,800 in our Volunteer force. Like the Artillerymen, their services would be most valuable when acting in coöperation with the 3,600 Engineers of our regular army.

Let me now contrast our Militia and Volunteer forces by the aid of a few figures. The total number of men in the Militia who appeared at training was but 74,000 as against 140,000 Volunteers. The number of Artillerymen in the Militia is but 12,000 as against 30,800 Volunteer Artillerymen. The cost of the Militia is about £1,250,000, of the Volunteers, £640,000, or less than one-half. The

Volunteer force also, I must again repeat, does not interfere in the slightest degree with recruiting for the Army; the Militia, on the contrary, does. These, I think, are facts sufficient to show that the forces are very different in their character, and they establish clearly that there would be no inconsistency in advocating the abolition of the one and the maintenance of the other.

The Volunteers have a fair proportion of all arms, except Cavalry, and that should be got over by simply incorporating with them the Yeomanry, numbering nearly 10,000, and then the whole force should be divided into Army Corps, ready to link with the five Army Corps of the line.

## X.

THE FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES SUGGESTED.—  
THE GREAT WEALTH OF THE NATION AN OBSTACLE TO  
ECONOMY.—THE GERMAN MILITARY BUDGET OF 1870.—  
ESTIMATED COST OF THE BRITISH ARMY ON AN IM-  
PROVED MODEL.—CONSCRIPTION NOT THE REAL CAUSE  
OF THE LIMITED EXPENDITURE IN GERMANY.—THE  
REGIMENTAL SYSTEM REVIVED THROUGH ARMY CORPS.  
—VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT AUDIT  
OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

I NOW come to the consideration of the financial merits of the changes which I advocate. The people almost intuitively feel that our military expenditure is excessive, and have more reason than ever to do so since their experience of the past four years.

A German once said to me, truly, that nothing stood more in the way of the sound organization of our Army than our great wealth; his own nation being poor, in 1807, had to devise with care a system at once efficient and economical; we think

everything is to be cured merely by more money ; indeed, manifest as are the causes which now threaten the very existence of our Army, nothing would astonish me less than that the War Department should say that they had come to the conclusion that a mere increase of pay would cure everything, and boldly ask the House of Commons to add half a million or a million a year to our Army Estimates in order to give 4d. or 6d. a day of increased pay.

Merely an increase of pay without a thorough reorganization upon modern principles, would do more harm than good, and, besides, make us the laughing stock of Europe.

For the miserable results which I have been pointing out in the previous pages, our average annual expenditure for the past four years—after deducting repayments by the Navy, and not taking into account payments for the Abolition of Purchase and Brigade Depôts, but adding cost of fortifications—was £13,600,000.

Now, in 1870, what was the cost of the great army of Prussia ? Here it is :—

## PRUSSIAN MILITARY BUDGET, 1870.

Peace Establishment of 315,526 men, 73,307 horses, 808 field guns.  
Expandable in war to 944,421 men, 193,930 horses, 1680 field guns.

1.		£	£
1	Pay of Troops ... ..	3,332,969	
2	General Staff Intendance, Governors of Fortresses ... ..	306,033	
3	Officers and Sundry Services... ..	627,499	
4	Divine Service ... ..	22,453	
5	Military Justice... ..	19,737	
6	Hospital Service... ..	210,884	
7	Purchase of Horses and Expenses ... ..	176,570	
			4,696,155
2.			
8	Provisions and Forage ... ..	2,215,869	
9	Clothing ... ..	701,722	
10	Artillery, Armaments, &c. ... ..	384,990	
			3,252,571
3.			
11	New Barracks and Utensils ... ..	254,466	
12	Current Expenditure ... ..	195,022	
13	Building and Maintaining Fortifica- tions and Fortresses ... ..	242,679	
			692,067
4.			
14	Military Education ... ..	96,579	
15	Travelling and Miscellaneous Service	130,990	
16	Administration of the Army ... ..	51,739	
			279,308
			8,920,101
NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICE.			
Pensions, Officers, Employés, and			
	Invalids, Prussia ... ..	884,471	
	Government addition to Widows and Children, Prussia ... ..	123,187	
	Mecklenburg and Saxony, say ... ..	210,000	
			1,217,658
			£10,137,759
Paid by Friends ... ..			506,000
			£10,642,579

NOTE.—I found at Berlin that the pay of the soldier was so small their friends had to allow them something extra, amounting to one silver groschen a day, or 36s. 9d. a year, so think it fair to add that amount to the cost of their army.



To this Budget let me append a few notes :—

NOTES ON BUDGET.

No. 4.—Divine service is less costly than with us, because the number of garrison chapels is very small. The soldiers are taken at least once a month to a public place of worship; a sensible system, which we might well adopt.

No. 6.—The hospitals could accommodate 16,758 sick. In 1868 7,390 soldiers were on an average daily in hospital. In 1872 in the British army, out of 92,000, 3,628 were constantly in hospital.

No. 7.—6,492 horses were bought, at an average of £24 each, costing in all \$163,000; besides keeping and feeding 73,000 horses. In three years, 1871-2 and 3, we bought only 6,142, costing about \$40 each; or on an average 2,050 horses a year, costing £82,000. We only kept and fed 15,000.

WAGGONS.—Every army corps has all its field waggons, &c., ready complete. Ours, where are they?

No. 9.—CLOTHING.—Complete suits of clothing are always kept in store for the whole of the Prussian reserve forces.

DESERTERS.—Expense of arrest and transport of deserters and support of military prisoners on the march cost £445. What does ours cost?

N.B.—Prussia is an expensive country to defend, having so great a land frontier. Many fortifications are required, yet all that expenditure is included in the Military Budget. With us, in addition to our army estimates, we have raised, under various Acts of Parliament since 1860 to 1874, £6,775,085.

I beg the reader's careful consideration of this Budget. He will see that it is the power of sound organization that gives the great results which Prussia has attained; and although it is true that

conscription gives her a cheap Army, as regards pay, yet if both countries got their men for nothing, it will be seen that this would not alter the disparity between the two systems, as to management or cost.

For my own satisfaction, I made an estimate of the cost of the plan which I advocate. It was prepared with great care, and has been corrected by a military friend of great ability.

It is as follows :—

ESTIMATE.		
Officers and Men.	COLONIES.	
	Cost founded upon present estimate .....	£1,556,152
22,000	Gift of £30 a man on leaving the service at end of seven years instead of a pension .....	90,000
	Education, as per estimate, .....	1,646,152
	1874-5 (exclusive of Colonies) ..	132,000
	Works and Buildings (exclusive of £185,000 for Colonies) .....	250,000
	Divine Service (exclusive of Colonies) .....	38,000
	Administration .....	122,000
	Artillery, Armaments, &c .....	200,000
1,345	Hospital Corps ...	1,740,550
4,444	Garrison Artillery } Pay .....	
1,500	Coast Brigade .....	294,996
	Clothing, barracks, fuel, light, medical attendance .....	68,371
		363,367

## ESTIMATE.—(Continued.)

## ARMY CORPS.

Men	11,839.	Pay, £525,000 × 5.....	2,625,000	
	„	Clothing, barracks, &c., £115,377 × 5 .....	576,885	
Horses		Guns and accoutrements, £33,600 × 5.....	168,000	
15,000		Keep of 3,000 horses and harness repairs £120,000 × 5 .....	600,000	
59,195		Purchase 300 horses, and ex- penses, 13,500 × 5 .....	81,000	4,050,885
15,000	88,484	Total .....	£807,477	6,800,404

## RESERVE FORCES.

80,000	Trained men on furlough £20 a-year .....	£1,600,000	
	Ditto, pay and expenses (week's training), £1 .....	80,000	
	Ditto, clothing, arms, &c., £2 10s.	200,000	1,880,000
170,000	Volunteers .....	640,000	
10,000	Yeomanry .....	80,000	720,000
			9,400,474
	Pensions, say .....		1,000,000
348,848			£10,400,404

NOTE.—The above estimate gives 12s. 9d. a week of pay to all privates, besides lodging, fuel, light, clothing, and medical attendance, or in all equal to a total yearly pay of £41 14s. 5d. and provides complete suits of clothing and arms for the reserves. The above estimate provides for officers always with the colours sufficient for the Reserve when called out in case of war, proportionately of the same number and rank as the Prussian Army.

N.B.—Until the present pension list of £2,210,000 is decreased, the estimates would be equal to £11,600,000.

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If the pay suggested did not attract good men, even the addition of sixpence a day would only be £757,000 a year.

It may be asked why even should our army cost so much as £10,400,000, when Prussia only spent £10,600,000 for a much greater force. My answer is that the men comprising the Army which I propose we should have, would be the finest in Europe, men equal in every respect to our British police. Not only would their pay when with the colours be four times as much as the pay of the Prussian soldier, but they would be better clothed and housed; and, moreover, whilst the pay of the Prussian soldier on furlough is nothing; the cost of paying ours I put at £1,680,000, and then also the charge of £720,000 for the Volunteers and Yeomanry, is of the same nature; but then the strain upon the country for recruits will be very small compared with Prussia. She raised 100,000 recruits every year to maintain a standing of 300,000 men, which at the end of seven years comes up to a war strength of 640,000 men, or to a grand total 940,000 at the end of twelve years.

By the plan which I advocate we would raise for our Home and Colonial Army 23,000 recruits annually, to maintain a standing Army of 88,000, coming up to a war strength of 168,000, and of 250,000 at the end of twelve years. A product the same in proportion to the initial number of recruits in each case.

I have no doubt that on the establishment of the Army Corps system such a healthy competition would arise between the five Lieutenant-Generals at the head of the several Army Corps that a considerable reduction in the cost that I have reckoned upon would ensue. It is to the eye of the master that we must look for that watchful care which produces success. In our Army, at present, we have no such thing.

No competition, no rivalry exists. Establish the Army Corps system, and wholesome rivalry immediately commences; each Lieutenant-General will vie with another in endeavouring to make his Army Corps the most attractive to good men; the most attached to by its reserves; the most economical in its management, and in showing his supe-

rior skill in handling his men in the field on the occasion of the annual Autumn Manœuvres. We are not unfrequently reminded of the value of the Regimental system, and no doubt it has advantages; now the regimental system is dead, but the Army Corps system will revive it, and all that *esprit de corps* which existed in regiments may now reappear, but upon modern principles—the more extended form of Army Corps.

I would here also add that with a better class of men in our Army, like the Prussians, we should require fewer officers. Officers are in relation to soldiers just what overlookers are to *employés*, and in proportion as the *employés* are intelligent or the reverse, so is the number of overlookers needed.\*

Were it not that I feel that it is most undesirable to extend the limits of this pamphlet, I could point out clearly wherein the savings I speak of would arise. But under whatever system our military affairs in the future may be administered, one

\* See Appendix VI., page 125.

great defect exists now, which it is imperatively necessary Parliament should correct. I allude to the absence of an independent audit of the expenditure incurred by the War Department.

It is acknowledged on all hands that no more important financial reform has been effected during the present generation than the placing of the accounts of the Civil Service and Revenue Departments under the control of an officer, responsible to the House of Commons, and it passes my comprehension to understand why this same rule is not at once extended to the accounts of the War Department. Why should that department be permitted greater latitude and laxity in the expenditure of the money voted by Parliament than the Home Office, the Foreign Office, and even the Treasury itself?

## XI.

THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.—ITS INEFFICIENCY AND EXTRAVAGANT COST.—THE BURDEN WHICH IT IMPOSES UPON THE NATIVES OF INDIA.—THEIR OPINION OF IT.—OUR GREAT MILITARY EXPENDITURE A FIT SUBJECT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS.—MEASURES OF REFORM.—A SEPARATE SYSTEM OF RECRUITING FOR INDIA NECESSARY.—THE ECONOMY THAT WOULD BE THEREBY EFFECTED.—CONSIDERATION OF SOME OBJECTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN OFFERED.

I MAY claim, I think, to have clearly shown that the condition of our Army at home is a mere mass of confusion. I will now briefly glance at the condition of our Indian Army—that other branch of our military force which I also asserted stood very much in need of reform. The position of our Army in India, as regards efficiency and extravagant cost, is really worse than that of our home Army. And so far as it is concerned, it ought to be borne in mind that we are really dealing with other people's money, and it becomes us there-



fore to be all the more careful and prudent about it. While spending money which is our own, we can afford to do as we like. The European forces we maintain in India are kept there for the purpose of retaining our possession of that country, and we make the races whom we have conquered pay for them. Now our military expenditure in India is, if possible, even more unsatisfactory than it is at home, and it presses much more severely upon our fellow-subjects in India. They have, plainly and clearly expressed their views upon the question, and just as in the case of our Continental neighbours, who, I have observed, know well the state and condition of our home Army, so do the natives of India show that they are more conversant with our military position in that country than probably we are ourselves.

The growth of our military expenditure in India has been the source of much dissatisfaction, and very naturally so. In 1853 Mr. Bright, when speaking of India in relation to the great cost of the Army, remarked that it amounted to twelve millions sterling, or about equal to the whole land

revenue of the Indian Empire. After the Mutiny the expenditure having largely increased, a military commission was appointed, and after a careful scrutiny the members reported that, in their opinion, the total expenditure upon the Indian Army and all its branches should be brought down to the amount of twelve millions annually. Instead, however, of this having been done, the expenditure has been permitted to grow and increase year by year until in 1871-72 it reached the enormous sum of eighteen millions sterling! And notwithstanding this increased expenditure the strength and efficiency of the Army had not improved.

The ordinary sources of revenue in India were unable to bear this increased expenditure. The land tax was felt and acknowledged to be as heavy as the people could well pay. The Indian Government were compelled to rack their brains for a new tax. They hit upon the income tax, and the imposition of it roused such a feeling of irritation and opposition that it had ultimately to be withdrawn. The ill effects which it produced, however, I fear

will be more lasting, for it roused the natives of India, and caused them to examine into the source of such extravagant expenditure. In 1871, a native of India, writing to the *Times* newspaper respecting certain opinions expressed by Lord Napier about the native princes in India, said, "That the military expenditure of India is "one of the main causes of these detested taxes "which the Government has of late been so freely "imposing upon the people." The tax more especially alluded to here was the income tax imposed in 1860, and from which about a million sterling was derived. It has, as I have just remarked, in deference to the outcry made against it by the Indian people, since been repealed.

The merchants and manufacturers of Lancashire, I observe, are far from satisfied with another Indian tax, which, but for our costly military armaments in India, might easily be dispensed with. A deputation of them waited a few weeks ago upon Lord Salisbury, to protest against the import duties levied upon our manufactures sent into India. And what was the answer of the noble lord? Not

that he would endeavour to reduce the military expenditure, and so render the tax unnecessary, but simply that he could do nothing for the gentlemen who waited upon him, because the £800,000 the import duties yielded, was an amount of revenue he could not afford to forego. Richard Cobden was accustomed to say that the first difficulty he had to overcome in pressing for a repeal of the Corn Laws was to get the farmers of England to understand their own interest. How long will it be before the manufacturers and merchants of England are aroused to see how closely their own interests are bound up in Army Reform, both at home and in India? I venture to urge that it is a question of vital importance to them, and well worth the constant and careful attention of every chamber of commerce in the kingdom.

A partial reduction in the expenditure upon our Indian army has taken place. By the last accounts published, the expenditure for 1872-3, including barracks, &c., is given as under £16,674,170; and under Lord Northbrook, who is acquainted with military questions, it is fair to expect some

radical reduction and some change in our present unsound and costly system of recruiting for India ; but from what we see of public life, reforms are not rapidly effected, and unless the eye and the ear of the public are on the alert, nothing is done.

Within the limits now at my disposal, it would be impossible for me to go into the whole question of the reform of our Indian army. The main point which I wish to make clear is that until we give up our present system of recruiting for general service and adopt a separate enlistment for Home Service and for Indian and Colonial service, we cannot hope for any material improvement in either ; we will not get willing service for either army, nor will we reduce the dissatisfaction and the extravagance which exist. The present system of recruiting for India is not only most unsound and costly, as regards India, but it is most detrimental to recruiting for our Home Army.

The whole question of recruiting for India has been raised most fully before a Committee of the House of Commons during the past two Sessions, and the evidence very clearly shows that the

recruits formerly obtained by the East India Company at Warley were better than those now obtained, and at an average cost for all arms of £27, with about 3 months' drill; whereas the Indian Government now contracts to pay £136 for a Cavalry recruit of 10 months' drill, and for an Infantry recruit of 7 months' drill £63.

It is also shown that since the amalgamation of the two armies the War Office has practically the monopoly of supplying a soldier, and India has to go to that one manufactory alone, and pay not only an extravagant price, but in place of getting the article agreed and paid for—viz., a Cavalry soldier of 10 months' training for £136, an Infantry soldier of 7 months' training for £63—it is found that for 4 years the average training of the Cavalry soldier supplied, instead of being 10 months, was 4 months 9 days; and the Infantry, instead of 7 months, was 3 months 22 days, and Artillery much the same. The India Office say they could recruit a great deal cheaper and better themselves. No doubt they could, not only with advantage to the Indian service, but

with great advantage to our home service. India suffers from the desertions, mortality, and immorality of our home army, for we charge them a proportion of the whole cost; and from much of this, if in their own hands, they would be comparatively free.

The Indian Service is most popular, and if we offered a separate enlistment for India and our colonies for a term of 6 or 7 years, then to end (unless we re-engaged them for 2 or 3 more) and gave a lump sum in hand at the conclusion of our engagement with them, it would be much more satisfactory to all parties than the granting of a pension after a long period of service. Many of them would find permanent civil employment in the increasing industrial and commercial establishments in India and our colonies. The development of the railway system in India must open a wide field of employment of this kind. With a short service system of three years for our Home Army, a distinct and separate enlistment for India and the Colonies becomes absolutely necessary. We now send out regiments to India consisting of men

of all ages, some much too old. By separate enlistment suitable men only would be sent; and that this is not merely a money question I will show by referring to the influence of age on the mortality of our troops in India. The extract from the Army Medical Report bearing upon this point will be found in the appendix.\*

The period that all medical testimony shows is the best for men to stay in India is five or six years. With a six years' enlistment, young men of twenty going out would give not only a better Army than we now have, but would save the lives of hundreds of men annually, who die because they either go out to India too old or remain there too long. A regiment now goes out with men of all ages, whereas by separate enlistment young men would be sent out, at an age when the risk would be comparatively little; moreover, the extent of invaliding would be greatly diminished, and the cost of transport would certainly not be increased although the period of service were shortened.

But, advantageous as a separate system of

\* See Appendix, page 121.



enlistment would be to India, it would unquestionably also prove of the greatest service to the recruiting for our Home Army. It would enable us to adopt a uniform system of short service with perfect simplicity of engagement, and this would induce thousands of men to join, who would on no account enlist so long as it is uncertain whether they may be ordered abroad on a day's notice, and for a period of six years at least. Is it consistent with common-sense, or in accordance with our every-day experience, to expect, for instance, that men will come forward freely and join, say a police service, upon the understanding that they may be any day shipped to Calcutta or to the West Indies, without their inclination being consulted?

Objections, I am aware, have been taken to separate systems of recruiting for our home and foreign armies; but a candid consideration of them will show, I think, that they are not entitled to much weight.

It is alleged that since the amalgamation of the Home and Indian armies they have become one force, and all in it should be held liable for service

anywhere. But the enlistment of men for six or seven years' service in India and the colonies, and for three years' service at home need not interfere with the administration of the Army as one force.

Another objection is, that a separate enlistment would induce competition, and it is represented that all recruits should be trained and controlled by the War Department. There is no reason why recruiting should not be, as now, entirely controlled by the War Department. The recruits for India might be passed directly to a separate dépôt. Competition would not arise under separate enlistment, it would simply enable the recruiting officer to offer to a man a choice of services, the conditions of each of which he would clearly comprehend and understand. Until we do this, I repeat we cannot expect to get the right men for either.

A separate system of enlistment for India would in no way alter the position of the officers of the Army who might serve as at present either at Home, in India, or the Colonies.

I may here say that with 60,000 British soldiers

in India on six or seven years' service, the number of exchanges and reliefs annually would not entail more cost than at present, and there cannot be a doubt that the troops serving in India might be conveyed to and from by contract at a much lower cost than now.

## XII.

IMMORALITY OF OUR PRESENT SYSTEM.—THE REMEDY.—  
THE BRITISH SOLDIER OUGHT TO BE RESPECTED AND  
NOT SHUNNED.

**I**N the foregoing pages I have mainly looked at the inefficiency and great cost of our present system, and have pointed out what appears to me to be the cure ; but are there no higher considerations than military efficiency and mere money saving ?

As a Christian nation, surely the principles of the religion we profess deserve to be recognised and held in remembrance. But at the present time I confess it appears to me that under our military system morality and immorality are regarded very much in the same light. I have asked for years this question, Why should the moral law enjoined upon us by our national faith be formally set aside and disregarded in this important service of the State and in no other ?

The agitation for a repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts has drawn attention to the immorality inseparably connected with our present military system, and has undoubtedly shown that a short service system fully carried out would prevent men from being separated, as they now generally are when they enter the Army, from the influence of their family, and condemned to prolonged celibacy, and to all the intense monotony and dangerous dullness inseparable from barrack life, especially so after a few years, when a man has learnt his duties as fully as he possibly can learn them, and is employed in repeating them, day by day, *ad nauseam*.

No one can be long in the vicinity of a large barracks without seeing the bad effects of placing men in such unfavourable circumstances.

Were the whole people acquainted with our present system, it would so shock their consciences, that I am convinced that they would be most earnest and hearty in demanding immediate military reform.

Indeed, did they hear through our newspaper

correspondents that such a system existed anywhere else in the world, they would raise their eyes in pious horror, and missionaries, without delay, would be despatched to that benighted nation in the hope of converting the people.

Our Army, in place of being the means of deteriorating our population, could, and should, be the means of improving it.

May the day soon come when a British soldier, in place of being shunned by a family, and debarred from social standing as an outcast, will be regarded as one belonging to an honourable and intelligent body of men, who are only for a short time separated from home and domestic ties, and that for the highest of purposes—the protection and safety of the nation !



## APPENDIX.

### I., p. 22.

RECRUITING, BY AUTHORITY, ISSUED 20TH FEBRUARY,  
1874. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE ARMY. TERMS  
ON WHICH YOUNG MEN ARE INVITED TO JOIN HER  
MAJESTY'S FORCES.

#### *Conditions of Service.*

1. Recruits may be enlisted for long or short service  
in such proportions as may from time to time be  
directed by the Adjutant General for—

I.—Cavalry .. .. .	{ Long service,—i.e., for 12 years' Army service; or, Short service,—i.e., for 8 years Army service, and 4 years' Reserve service.
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II.—Artillery .. .. .	{ Long service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 12 years' Army service; or, Short service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 8 years' Army service, and 4 years' Reserve service.
III.—Engineers .. .. .	{ Long service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 12 years' Army service; or, Short service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 8 years' Army service and 4 years' Reserve service.
IV.—Infantry .. .. .	{ Long service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 12 years' Army service; or, Short service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 6 years' Army service and 6 years' Reserve service.
V.—Army Service Corps—	{ Long service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 12 years' Army service; or, Short service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 6 years' Army service and 6 years' Reserve service.
VI.—Army Hospital Corps .	{ Long Service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 12 years' Army service.
VII.—Colonial Corps .. .	{ Long Service,— <i>i.e.</i> , for 12 years Army service.

But, within such limits as may from time to time be prescribed, soldiers may on the recommendation of

their commanding officers, and with their own free assent, after three years' Army service, pass to the Reserve, and complete in that force the unexpired portion of their engagement.

2. Any soldier on completion of 11 years' Army service, or 9 years in certain cases when ordered for foreign service, may, with the consent of his commanding officer, or other competent military authority, be re-engaged for such period as shall complete 21 years in Her Majesty's Service.

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## II., p. 25.

### INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

16, Cornwall Gardens, Queen's Gate,  
April, 1872.

THE present crisis in the military affairs of the country appears to me to be of such grave importance that I have been induced to reprint the remarks which I made on the subject in the House of Commons on the 4th of March.

I am convinced that if the policy which the Government now seeks to have sanctioned was better understood by the country, it would certainly be rejected. The military organization proposed, so far from putting

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an end to the recurrence of disastrous panics, will prove a delusion when the day of need arises ; and the more thoroughly to establish this system, the House of Commons is about to be asked to sanction a vote of three millions and a-half sterling.

In our military administration there are three points which the country must insist upon being recognised, if we are ever to have efficiency and economy in connection with it.

First—The term of service in the ranks must be shortened to a period of three years (except for India and the Colonies), in order that we may obtain an efficient and reliable Reserve Force.

Second—The number of officers in the Army, especially those of the higher ranks, must be greatly reduced.

Third—The Army must be subdivided into distinct, yet complete, Army Corps, to be located in special districts.

In respect to the first of these points, the present Government distinctly affirmed their entire concurrence in the short-service system in the Session of 1870. They themselves proposed that it should be limited to three years. Mr. Cardwell, in a speech which will be found reported in *Hansard*, vol. cci., p. 787, earnestly upheld this principle, and in Committee on the Army

Enlistment Bill, he successfully resisted, by a large majority, a motion made by Colonel Barttelot to extend the term to a minimum of five years. Last year, again, when proposing the abolition of the purchase system, the right hon. gentleman recognized, as part of his scheme of military reform, a service of three years with the colours.

In regard to the second point, compared with other European Armies of acknowledged superiority and efficiency, the proportion of officers which Mr. Cardwell seeks to maintain in our Army is much too large, and this is especially the case in the higher ranks.

Upon the adoption of a system of Army Corps depends entirely the simplification of, and economy in, the administration of our Army, the certainty of our having a perfect control system, the proficiency of our officers in their duties, the fixing of a direct responsibility upon every man in the Service, and the clearing away of that tangled labyrinth which now exists, and which hinders the people from understanding that which ought to be most clear and simple.

Measured by this standard, of what value are the propositions made by the Secretary of State for War this Session?

As regards the principle of a short service system, he has absolutely abandoned it. Instead of passing

men more quickly through the ranks into the Reserve, and thus really leaving more barrack accommodation, he actually proposes that the House of Commons shall sanction an expenditure of 'no less than three millions and a-half, mainly to increase and maintain a force which I unhesitatingly assert is acknowledged to be positively dangerous for us to rely upon for defensive purposes. It is idle to pretend that our Militiamen, with a few months' drill only imposed upon them, could contend successfully with other European forces which undergo a careful and continuous training for three years, and I have never yet been able to see that because the Militia is a force intended only for defence—that is, to drive an enemy from our own shores—an inferior standard of fighting power should suffice. Most people, I believe, would think that in such an extremity we would require the very best of soldiers. It has just been acknowledged by the War Department that it is but experimenting; *but my impression is that it is not in earnest in seeking to create a really powerful and efficient Reserve Force of well-trained men.* If it is, and expects to have such a force in the course of a few years, how are we to characterise the folly of a policy which involves an expenditure of three millions and a-half for Militia barracks; for, unless the Government seriously propose to maintain

both a large Reserve Force and a Militia, such additional barrack accommodation is clearly unnecessary. This expenditure would be completed just about the time when the Militia ought to be disappearing.

The proposals of the Government, as now before the country, so far from modifying the second evil influence at work in our military system, really intensifies it.

The number of our officers has been reduced, it is true but I may state of the 1,239 so reduced, there are nearly 700 subalterns, who should have been retained, while the higher ranks remain almost untouched ; and this year it is actually proposed to increase the number of lieutenant-colonels and majors. The War Department is acting in direct opposition in respect to the practice now followed in every other branch of the Government service, and which is to reduce as far as possible the number of highly-paid officials.

The subdivision of the Army into compact and complete Army Corps is altogether ignored, and yet I am thoroughly satisfied that without the adoption of this system, we can neither have economy, efficiency, nor direct responsibility ; nor can we ever hope that the people can clearly comprehend, and thoroughly understand, our system of military administration.

The proposals of the Government conciliate several interests ; but such a temporizing policy to satisfy the political exigencies of the moment only establishes the necessity for the House of Commons acting with caution, and weighing with care the full meaning of the proposed mischievous expenditure of three millions and a-half of money which it will be immediately called upon to authorize.

JOHN HOLMS.

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## III., p. 34.

## ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.—FROM REPORT, 1872.

*On the Influence of Age on the Mortality of Troops  
serving in the United Kingdom.*

The mortality at the different ages, arranged in quinquennial periods, in the several arms of the Service, is shown in the following Table, framed from Abstract No. 3 in the Appendix.

Corps.	Annual Ratio of Deaths per 1,000 Living, at the following Ages:—					
	Under 20.	20 and under 25.	25 and under 30.	30 and under 35.	35 and under 40.	40 and up- wards
Household Cavalry .....	...	5.43	3.13	...	...	...
Cavalry of the Line .....	2.67	3.98	3.47	9.85	10.47	25.02
Royal Artillery .....	2.22	4.00	6.42	9.84	26.37	40.91
Foot Guards .....	.74	8.06	5.45	10.01	21.07	59.22
Infantry Regiments .....	2.84	5.45	4.43	12.32	17.80	22.22
Depôt and Coast Brigade Royal Artillery, and Depôt Battalions )	1.61	8.47	8.48	19.10	32.37	36.61
Ditto, ditto, 1862-71 .....	4.44	7.62	11.29	18.21	21.81	24.13
Average of preceding, exclusive of all Depôts .....	2.55	5.12	4.70	11.31	18.00	26.59
Ditto, ditto, 1862-71 .....	2.90	5.39	7.06	12.51	17.21	19.95
Civil Male ( England and Wales	7.41	8.42	9.21	10.23	11.63	13.55
Population ( Healthy Districts	5.83	7.30	7.93	8.36	9.00	9.86



The ratio of mortality among the troops, exclusive of those at the Depôts, was reduced at all the ages below 35, but increased at those above it. The decrease between 25 and 30, and the increase above 40 were considerable. As during the preceding year, the proportion of deaths between 25 and 30 was lower than that between 20 and 25. In the Depôts the rate of mortality was above the average at all the ages except those under 20 and between 25 and 30.

[From the above it is clear that, when men reach over thirty years of age, service in the Army is unhealthy compared with the civil population.]

☞ On the following page will be found a tabulated statement of the influence of age on mortality in India.

## ON THE INFLUENCE OF AGE ON MORTALITY IN INDIA.

In Abstract No. 20 in the Appendix the details are given of the strength and deaths, at different ages, of the troops serving in India in 1872. The following table shows the results, and also the average of the ten preceding years :—

	Under 20.		20 and under 25.		25 and under 30.		30 and under 35.		35 and under 40.		40 and upwards.	
	Strength on 1st January.	Died.	Strength on 1st January.	Died.	Strength on 1st January.	Died.	Strength on 1st January.	Died.	Strength on 1st January.	Died.	Strength on 1st January.	Died.
Bengal .....	1,938	16	10,041	230	8,983	221	7,309	230	3,323	156	533	48
Madras .....	754	6	2,790	45	2,213	35	2,231	57	869	33	208	16
Bombay .....	760	5	3,474	56	2,239	42	1,377	40	733	27	134	4
Total .....	3,467	27	16,305	331	13,805	298	10,917	327	4,925	216	875	66
Ratio of deaths per 1,000 of strength {	7.79		20.30		22.25		29.95		43.86		75.43	
(250) .....	9.00		17.30		23.85		32.99		41.38		63.50	
Ditto, 1862-71 .....												

[From the above it will be seen that in 1872 the death rate under 30 was at the rate of 2 per cent., whilst above that it was at the rate of 33 per cent. So that in that year 266 lives were lost by present system.]

## IV., p. 24.

ACTUAL NUMBERS OF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND  
MEN ON HOME SERVICE AND IN MILITIA ON  
30TH NOVEMBER, 1873, AND IN INDIA AND COLONIES  
ON 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1873.

Home ..	90,469, of whom were over 30 years of age..	31,804
India ..	59,064                   "                   "	.. 22,593
Colonies	21,538                   "                   "	.. 6,618
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	171,071	61,015

Militia..	101,087, of whom 16,251 were under 19 years of age.	
	46,402                   from 19 to 25	
	22,104                   from 25 to 30	
	16,330                   over 30	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	101,087	101,087

Add Perma-	
nent Staff	3,678
	<hr/>
	104,765

Number at  
Training,  
1873 .. 74,208

No. 1 Re-  
serve .. 7,477 had not been called out for training.

Number of Recruits sent to India in year ending 30th

November, 1873 .. .. . 3,451

Number of Invalids from India .. .. . 3,576

Return 67, 26th March, 1874.

Average Home Army.

In Prison ..	.. .. .	1,554
In Hospital ..	.. .. .	3,357

	HOME ARMY.		COLONIAL.	INDIAN.	
	MILITIA serving at home, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	REGULAR FORCES main- tained for Service and the United Kingdom, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	BRITISH TROOPS effective strength Non-Comma- nded Officers and Men of all Arms, including Invalids.	NATIVE TROOPS, Non- Commissioned Officers and Men.
1864	110,856	75,768	57,653	67,909	128,356
1865	98,868	78,410	54,899	63,107	124,278
1866	96,185	77,717	50,962	60,293	124,789
1867	96,944	76,848	50,053	5,660	115,875
1868	103,782	85,040	45,053	56,476	116,706
1869	108,911	84,361	37,301	57,616	117,371
1870	109,040	82,472	24,196	57,067	116,188
1871	Average roundly * 05,000	94,402	25,093	58,817	115,048
1872		101,145	25,008	60,401	115,555
1873		98,719	21,092	60,345	No return.
		AVERAGE	OF LAST 4 Y	EARS	
	105,000	91,000	24,500	60,000	
	* No returns in continua- tion of above but roundly from other data 105,000 wa-average.	Parlia- mentary Return 367, July 30, 1873.	From Army Abstract and Return.	Appendix, page 267, Report East India Fi- nance, 1874.	Appendix, page 910, Report East India Fi- nance, 1873.

## V.

*Recruiting and Desertion.*

	RECRUITS Joined the		DESETERTS Advertised for		DESETERTS who escaped.
	Army.	Militia.	Army.	Militia.	
1864	16,33	18,700	4,889	7,577	3,079
1865	14,130	18,700	5,448	6,241	3,519
1866	15,277	18,700	5,260	3,682	3,583
1867	19,453	18,700	5,949	3,353	3,449
1868	17,060	18,700	4,609	3,619	3,011
1869	12,020	18,700	4,018	3,836	3,341
1870	24,594	18,700	4,480	3,721	3,171
1871	23,568	25,000	6,967	6,641	4,553
1872	17,791	30,154	7,653	7,673	5,860
1873	17,194	25,361	7,094	10,448*	5,800
1874	20,640	29,500	6,904	10,500	...
Average last 5 years.	20,750	25,743	6,600	7,800	5,000

\* Is for year ending 30th November, 1873.

*Recruiting and Desertion (continued).*

	1873 Recruits joined these Arms of Service.	1873 Deserted these Arms of Service.	1874 Recruits joined these Arms of Service.	1874 Deserted these Arms of Service.
Cavalry .....	2,078	944		0·6
Artillery .....	3,479	1,368		2,066
Engineers .....	443	131		159
Army Service .....	194	57		52
Infantry .....	10,760	4,094		3,641
	16,954	7,094		6,904

## VI.

*The superior intelligence and ability of our British population.*

Mr. Redgrave, H.M. Inspector of Factories, in his report upon the textile industries of Europe, relative to the capacity of our working classes, says—

“That while the foreigner is under the same condition as to raw material as the English manufacturer, and his fuel is more expensive, his workpeople do not work with the same vigour and steadiness as Englishmen, as the evidence that has come before me has gone to prove that there is a great preponderance in favour of this country. Comparing the work of the British with a foreign spinner, the average persons employed to spindles is—

In France ... ..	1 to 14
„ Russia ... ..	1 to 28
„ Prussia ... ..	1 to 37
„ Great Britain ... ..	1 to 74

Our competition is everywhere dreaded, and yet we pay higher wages.”

## VII.

According to the census of 1871, there were in the United Kingdom 862,000 young men between the ages of 21 and 24 years.—8 per cent. is the deduction made in Prussia to find men fit for service.

The number of men in 1871 was as follows :

Age.		Great Britain.		Ireland.
20	..	223,750	..	57,840
21	..	218,530	..	54,260
22	..	212,700	..	50,700
23	..	205,800	..	47,100
24	..	197,850	..	47,500
25	..	188,560	..	40,000
26	..	179,300	..	37,500
27	..	171,000	..	35,000
28	..	165,600	..	34,500
29	..	158,000	..	32,000
30	..	156,000	..	28,650
30 to 35	..	735,800	..	133,000

NOTE.—Although population in Ireland has not decreased in same ratio since 1861 as it did previously, these figures for 1871 are taken upon the same bases of decrease.

## VIII

## THE VOLUNTEER CORPS.

The following is an abstract of the Annual Returns, furnished to the War Office, of the state of Volunteer Corps as they existed on the 1st of November last:—

Arm.	Maximum Establishment.	Super-numeraries authorised.	Efficients.	Non-Efficients.	Total Enrolled.	Officers and Sergeants who have obtained Certificates of Proficiency.	No. of Volunteers present at Annual Inspection during year ended 31st October, 1874.
Light Horse .....	995	9	400	156	556	36	370
Artillery .....	42,026	649	30,827	2,723	33,550	2,770	26,184
Engineer .....	8,410	210	5,842	453	6,301	484	4,949
Mounted Rifle.....	300	—	132	43	175	16	145
Rifle .....	183,473	2,384	122,492	10,831	133,323	10,643	106,809
Staff of Administrative Regiments not in- cluded in the returns of any Corps .....	235,204 1,481	3,252 —	159,633 1,407	14,212 75	173,905 1,482	13,946 203	138,451 *1,407
Grand Total.....	236,685	3,252	161,100	14,287	175,387	14,152	139,858

\* Approximate.



# IX.

## COMPOSITION OF OUR HOME ARMY.

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN IN EACH ARM OF THE SERVICE  
AT HOME ON THE 30TH NOV. 1873.

Household Cavalry	...	...	...	...	1,205
Cavalry of the Line	...	...	...	...	11,098
Royal Artillery	...	...	...	...	17,558
Royal Engineers	...	...	...	...	3,594
Foot Guards	...	...	...	...	5,611
Infantry of the Line	...	...	...	...	47,854
Army Service Corps	...	...	...	...	2,790
Army Hospital Corps	...	...	...	...	750
					<hr/> 90,469

### MILITIA.

#### Great Britain and Ireland.

Artillery	...	...	...	...	12,225
Infantry and Rifles	...	...	...	...	88,862
					<hr/> 101,087
YEOMANRY	..	..	...	...	9,981

